



ARTICLE V and NATO

The Core Clause

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Introduction

The North Atlantic Alliance is not necessarily the “dream alliance” it seemed in the 1990s but it remains the optimal option in the security policy of Poland and other Central, Eastern and Southern European countries, at least in the present phase of international relations. Such two principal conclusions flow from CIR-inspired debates on Polish and regional security taking place in-between the NATO summits in Riga (November 2006) and in Bucharest (due in February 2008). Participants include experts on security matters – politicians, political scientists and commentators – from Visegrad countries and other neighboring states.

Two conferences¹ were organized as part of “Changing NATO and Central and Eastern European Agenda”, a project principally supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, with help from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Both were devoted to discussing an issue which in our region is deemed to be of particular importance in the context of the alliance’s functioning: security guarantees and Article V of the Washington Treaty, which – putting it simply – was the reason why Poland and other countries in the region wanted to join NATO in the first place, given their previous experience from the period which saw them in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet sphere of influence. “Key geographic position,” as one discussant phrased it, means that the question of Article V and its attendant obligations is incessantly raised.

Political and military conditions in and around the countries lying in the centre of Europe have indeed been transformed, but the significance they attach to Article V as “the core clause” has changed only to a certain extent. And to what extent exactly? What role ought Article V to play in view of all foreseeable circumstances, primarily terrorist threats? When – besides instances where direct support for an ally is called for – can, or should Article V be invoked?

Throughout the two gatherings, debate revolved around the disparity between Article V perceived as a unique security guarantee in the mid 1990s, i.e. before Poland’s, Czech Republic’s and Hungary’s accession to NATO as the first postcommunist states, and Article V today, with incommensurately less important direct threats and far greater so-

¹ Center for International Relations organized two conferences dealing with Article V in the context of Central, Eastern and Southern European security. The first, entitled “NATO and Article V”, was held on March 8th, 2007 in Warsaw. It was devoted to the role and evolution of Article V of the Washington Treaty in regard to contemporary security threats facing the Euro-Atlantic Area, and particularly Central-Eastern European states. Conference participants included the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Bogusław Winid, who delivered the key-note speech, and heads of think tanks and experts from several NATO member states: professor Peter Burgess (Peace Research Institute in Oslo), professor Cornel Codita (National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest), Osman Faruk Logoglu (President of the Eurasian Strategic Studies Center in Ankara), Kestutis Paulauskas (Deputy Defense Adviser at the Permanent Delegation of Latvia to NATO) and Dr Ivo Samson (Slovak Foreign Policy Association in Bratislava).

The second conference, entitled “NATO and EU in the Security Policies of the Central-Eastern European States”, was held on the May 17th, 2007. It was devoted principally to the security interests of Visegrad countries, and Central Europe in general. The key-note speaker was Mr. Władysław Stasiak, Head of the National Security Bureau. The conference featured representatives of think tanks from states constituting the Visegrad Group: Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati (International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest), Dr Ivo Samson (Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava), Dr Jiri Schneider (Prague Security Studies Institute, Prague). The conference was also attended by experts from: Germany – Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller (Head of the Berlin Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States); and Bulgaria – Dr Ivan Krastev (Programme Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia).

called asymmetric threats. The present publication is an unauthorized record of these discussions. We regard it as carrying special weight, as despite the on-going debate within NATO itself, leading to clear declarations of the Riga Summit,² analyses of Article V's purport in present and future settings are few and far between. Hence, Center for International Relations shall be considering the issue of construing security guarantees for NATO members, especially those bordering non-NATO states.

As it turns out, Article V, or the core clause, remains a key value, and not just for Poland, though its interpretation changes with the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Many view the credibility of security guarantees as a touchstone for the credibility of NATO in general. Yet discussion at the two CIR conferences has indicated potential future challenges which require retaining traditionally construed security guarantees stemming from Article V even at this early a stage, as well as other threats which could transform relations between different NATO or EU states, and the rapport between the two multilateral bodies.

Throughout the two powwows, participants underscored that our region's security ought to be considered not in a purely military context, but "in broader terms". But if that is the case, can Article V actually provide states lying within the Euro-Atlantic Area with any security guarantees against this new type of threat? To what extent have recent events in fact altered its scope and content? Can it remain the sole and unique security guarantee? Indeed, does it retain its import in the light of the contemporary world's strategic reality?

One speaker noted "an increasing tension" between the historical nature of Article V (collective defense against major aggression) and a new strategic environment of unclear adversaries and asymmetric threats. He viewed Article V as expressing "moral solidarity more than material assistance".

According to the Polish representative the fact that in the future collective defense will not play a key role in the functioning of the Alliance, as had been the case during the Cold War. The evolution of the Alliance's tasks moves it away from the traditionally understood collective defense. Security guarantees under Article V will however not lose their significance, as certain countries still see the danger of a possible armed attack. All NATO member countries may become targets of asymmetric attacks, said Bogusław Winid,

There were some nations who did not consider collective defense as the core purpose of the Alliance any longer and wanted expeditionary tasks to become the primary focus for NATO. Yet others argued that the nature of Article V itself is changing – it is no longer about the defense of Allied territories and population but rather crisis response and peace keeping outside NATO borders. The Central and Eastern European allies were the most vocal about the continuing importance of the Article V as ingrained in the Washington Treaty.

² The specific provisions of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, adopted during the NATO Summit held in Riga in November 2006, were:

"Collective defense will remain the core purpose of the Alliance. The character of potential Article V challenges is continuing to evolve. Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely; however, as shown by the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 following which NATO invoked Article V for the first time, future attacks may originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and involve unconventional forms of armed assault. Future attacks could also entail an increased risk of the use of asymmetric means, and could involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Defense against terrorism and the ability to respond to challenges from wherever they may come have assumed and will retain an increased importance".

As another panellist asserted, being a postmodern state *de facto* implies thinking beyond sovereignty and territoriality. “The major concern of a postmodern state is human security and welfare instead of state security and national sovereignty.”

To ponder Article V is, of course, to ponder NATO’s actual political significance and military prowess, which allows both joint defense of territory and effective expeditionary deployments. Although no one questioned the sense or legitimization of NATO’s existence, the same cannot be said of its role as “the basic guarantor of security for the country”. Is the division of labour between institutions responsible for “hard” and “soft” security (NATO and EU respectively) here to stay? “The necessity to make similar strategic ‘either-or’ choices cannot be excluded in the future,” noted one discussant.

In the backdrop of the debate over Article V there emerged issues pertaining to US-Europe relations and the shape of North Atlantic Alliance’s cooperation with Russia. “Russia is often seen as part of the solution rather than part of the problem,” underscored one of the speakers, while others claimed that we maintain relations with a country that remains “somewhat unpredictable”, or that “even if NATO had never expanded, Russia would still be posturing against NATO today”.

Maria Wągrowka
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Center for International Relations

Polish Perspective

Fresh Content – Traditional Obligations

Bogusław Winid

Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland³

The theme of Article V of the Washington Treaty is important and interesting. NATO is the most powerful alliance in the contemporary world; many say in the entire history of international relations. The North Atlantic Alliance is at present undergoing intensive change, adapting to new challenges, undertaking tasks beyond its traditional remit. All the while, it retains as one of its cornerstones Article V of the Washington treaty – an international legal obligation that in case any one ally is attacked, all others shall come to its aid. A question thus emerges as to Article V's significance to NATO in this day and age.

I should like briefly to address the following issues:

- First, Article V's place in the North Atlantic Alliance's present and future strategy;
- Second, challenges to Article V from the ever-changing strategic context;
- Third, Article V's future.

Recourse to the Washington Treaty

Article V has weighed heavily on the present shape of the Alliance, its structure and inner workings, despite having been formulated in a security environment utterly different from today's. It is incontrovertible that NATO's current usefulness to its members is largely due to this very clause. Thanks to it NATO passed muster, prevented Soviet aggression and helped integrate a divided Western Europe.

This was made possible not just as a result of enshrining Article V in the Washington Treaty, but also thanks to its being enacted through specific actions, and the creation of a dense web of mechanisms facilitating allies' everyday cooperation and their collective defense. I have in mind especially the joint exercises, operational and defense planning, or integrated command structure, as well as political-military consultations. No other political-military alliance in history had ever developed similar mechanisms that serve to integrate members and facilitate joint efforts, be they of military or political nature.

It is worth emphasizing that these same mechanisms are no less successful today, and not just in regard to collective defense, but also where matters concern entirely new challenges facing the Alliance. For instance NATO would be incapable of involvement in

³ In September 2007 Mr. Bogusław Winid was appointed the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to NATO and WEU.

peacekeeping operations were it not for its integrated command structure. Evidently adapted to suit the needs of expeditionary missions, it has been responsible for NATO's exemplary performance as a rapid reaction instrument. Cooperation with partners constitutes a further example. The Alliance would not be capable of supporting defense reform in partner countries had it not previously instigated similar reforms in member states. It would not know how to help newcomers install civilian and democratic control of the armed forces, had it not first done the same for its members.

No alternative

At this juncture it is worth noting that the European Union, with its ever increasing role in security matters, does not constitute a real alternative to NATO as regards collective defense. Nor is the EU ready for autonomous expeditionary operations of the type currently being undertaken by the Alliance. Yet thanks to non-military capability, the EU is NATO's natural and extremely valuable partner in international missions.

All this means that nowadays there is no simple way to wrest collective defense away from the Alliance's other tasks, or from its history. One could even go as far as to say that today NATO is what it is thanks to Article V.

This makes it easier to understand why Article V's significance is incessantly underscored in subsequent NATO documents. The same was true in Riga, with the summit declaration describing collective defense as the Alliance's core purpose, while Comprehensive Political Guidance, another document, notes that when participating in various operations, NATO should always retain the capability to defend its members' territory.

Still, there is no getting round the problem of fresh difficulties for Article V. For NATO is evolving away from tasks linked to collective defense as it has traditionally been construed, with entirely new challenges arising on a daily basis.

At home and far away

This factor impacts on the Alliance's military structure. As early as the beginning of the 1990s NATO significantly reduced its military presence on members' territory and got rid of tactical nuclear weapons. It overhauled its defense planning, shifting away from static defense structures in favour of expeditionary potential, in order to be better prepared for mission which are today deemed more likely. Nonetheless, it ought not to be forgotten that the process of NATO enlargement was conducted so as to augment new members' interoperability and their capacity to absorb aid in the face of a classic threat, as outlined in Article V. The watershed came on September 12th, 2001, when it was actually invoked for the very first time – albeit not in a situation for which it was conceived, viz. a classic act of aggression against a member's territory, but in response to an asymmetric terrorist attack.

Thus, it is worth considering what Article V-related tasks shall mean for NATO in future.

Future tasks

First, collective defense shall no longer take up as much space on the NATO agenda as during the cold war. The direction of NATO's evolution seems set. However, this should not mean that Article V remains but a formal quirk. For some member states the spectre of potential aggression looms larger than for others, and their interest in implementing Article V is thus accordingly greater. In contrast, asymmetric attacks, "incorporated" into Article V in the aftermath of 9/11, threaten members in equal measure.

Second, adapting NATO to fresh challenges need not hamper the development of its other functions. In effect, this is not really a problem at all, as the vast majority of specific military capabilities and initiatives are of a universal character – they can be used both for collective defense and for peacekeeping operations. Here, NATO Response Force, the flagship transformational initiative, serves as an excellent example. Thus, the overhaul actually contributes to increasing the collective defense capability, so long as several key mechanisms allowing the Alliance to defend its members retain appropriate form. These include, for instance, the need to deploy in flank countries some elements of the command structure and military infrastructure (ports, airstrips), up-to-date plans of strengthening NATO in case of attack, or inclusion of scenarios connected with collective security in exercise policy and operational planning. I am deeply convinced that the Alliance is able to remember all this without losing sight of its new tasks and roles. This is of particular importance to new member states, who need to be certain that when developing their own armed forces' expeditionary potential and participating in international missions, Article V continues to guarantee security against traditional threats.

Third, it appears that some change is inevitable as regards the nature of Article V, which, in view of the changing threats, is set to cover not just the allies' territorial integrity, but also their vital interests. Earlier I mentioned one such area, speaking of September 11th, 2001. Another example of the new "functional approach" are members' energy related interests.

Poland wants NATO to adapt to the new security environment. This is evinced by our involvement in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). We are in Afghanistan because we realize that threats which today remain distant from our borders, may tomorrow come knocking on our door. We also understand that reacting to them may not be the sole burden of a few allies.

It is predominantly through such cooperation that we wish to foster solidarity with allies, increasing their sense of responsibility for our security. And we want NATO to guarantee that should the need arise, it shall be physically capable of defending our territory.

We regard bilateral cooperation with allies as contributing to our efforts within NATO, not as an alternative thereto. This is borne out by our stance in regard to the construction of America's anti-missile shield which – it is my profound belief – shall benefit all allies' security.

Lithuanian Perspective

Learning to appreciate a new reality

Kestutis Paulauskas
Deputy Defense Advisor
Lithuanian Delegation to NATO

In '94 Lithuania was aspiring to join NATO of '49, which was supposed to help “keep Russians out and Americans in”. Paradoxically, the '04 enlargement has epitomized the irrelevance of the Cold War legacy and Lord Ismay’s famous slogan. By 2004, the Russians have been deeply engaged into European security affairs, whereas Americans have turned vocal about their intentions to realign their defense posture and downsize their military presence in Europe. Lithuania is still learning to appreciate this new reality.

Five strategic dilemmas

Lithuanian policy makers today face several major dilemmas.

First, there is the persistent, albeit suppressed, fear of Russia, which has links to all other strands of the Lithuanian security discourses and practices. Resurgent Russia is always at the background of Lithuania's threat assessment, even if it is not mentioned directly. On the other side of the equation, there is the broad Euroatlantic agenda featuring a rich bouquet of global security challenges – and Russia, quite simply, is not one of them. If anything, Russia is often seen as part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Thus there is a conflict between Lithuania's national anxieties vis-à-vis Russia, and Lithuania's membership in NATO and EU, which consider Russia a strategic partner.

The second dilemma is a direct consequence of integration process. From early 90s', Lithuania had set itself strategic objectives of becoming a member of NATO and the EU. Once that goal was achieved, the joy of “graduation” has turned into an existential question of “what’s next”? The comfortable life of clear objectives has ended and the uncharted waters without clear landmarks have now unfolded before the eyes of Lithuanian strategists. Only recently Lithuania has started to reassert its “new” foreign and defense policy objectives, including on the matter of this seminar – changing role of NATO.

Third dilemma is related to a quite striking although hardly unexpected revelation, which became especially apparent with the transatlantic rift over Iraq. Lithuania has always sought *Euroatlantic* integration – membership in NATO and the EU were seen as two

sides of the same coin. NATO was counted upon for providing „hard“ security, in the form of Article V, and the EU was seen as safe haven for uninhibited social and economic development. It turned out, however, that NATO and the EU were different actors with different and sometimes even conflicting security and defense aspirations. Having to choose sides during the Iraq crisis in the early 2003 have been a worrisome experience for Lithuanian decision makers. The necessity to make similar strategic choices “either – or” cannot be excluded in the future.

Lithuania has yet come to terms with the fact that NATO and the EU are global strategic actors with global strategic interests and global outreach, whereas Lithuania is a regional actor (at best), who (naturally) gives priority to regional interests and have very limited outreach, or, to employ *Realpolitik* terminology, power projection capabilities. Lithuania should be able to accommodate this challenge over time as it matures into an “older” member state. The trick for Lithuania is to start thinking globally as a full-fledged member of powerful international organizations, while pursuing her own regional interests.

Finally, there are deeper ontological problems related to the way Lithuanian political elite, media and a considerable part of academia understand security. Much of Lithuanian security discourses are ingrained in the traditional ontology of security concept (when it comes to security analysis) and the logic of geopolitics (when it comes to security policy). Although Lithuania is (at least formally) part of what R. Cooper calls the postmodern space, it still sees its environment through the thick windows of modern world. Being a postmodern state would imply thinking beyond sovereignty and territoriality. The major concern of a postmodern state is human security and welfare instead of state security and national sovereignty. The latter kind of terminology still prevails in Lithuanian security discourse. Lithuania lies on the outskirts of the postmodern European space, while bordering rather crude representatives of the modern world in the forms of hapless Kaliningrad region to the West and dictatorial Lukashenka's regime to the East. The ultimate challenge for Vilnius is to learn to abide by the rules of postmodern behavior of voluntary self-constraint in favor of collective goals, while bordering modern Eastern states, who still practice actively the modern games of power politics.

Key threads

All the above dilemmas constitute the broader context in which the public debate on security and defense matters takes place in Lithuania. There are several key threads of this debate.

Firstly, there has been an important shift towards a more nuanced and sophisticated perception of what constitutes security. Lithuanian political elite has started to view security in broader terms. In particular, military security is no longer seen as at stake for Lithuania (except among some radical segments of the elite and society). Other security challenges are coming to the fore: first and foremost, energy security, but also regional stability (related to Kaliningrad region and Belarus), and internal security matters.

As a result of the shift in security assessment, the importance of NATO and strategic relationship with the US has been veining ever since the enlargement, while the role of the EU has become much more prominent not only in domestic, but also foreign and defense policy of Lithuania. It is a common sense that there is little NATO can do to help Lithuania repelling political, economic and cultural pressure of Russia, resolve the problem of energy dependency, or solve internal security problems. In the meantime, the EU is pouring billions of euros into Lithuanian economy and enjoys much greater all-around impact on Lithuanian politics and policies (including security policy).

In the eyes of the media and the society, two NATO-related issues command the greatest public attention and debate. The first is Lithuanian-led PRT in Afghanistan, the second - NATO fighter aircrafts deployed in Lithuania to conduct air policing mission. The latter also happens to be the single most visible expression of Allied solidarity and collective defense, at least as understood by majority of Lithuanians. The Lithuanian society, however, is not aware that quite a few NATO allies oppose the current arrangement of air policing and are pressing the Baltic states to acquire their own fighter aircraft. For Lithuanian diplomats and defense officials it is an indication that the credibility of Article V may not be as unconditional as they used to believe.

As most NATO insiders know, the CPG provision that “collective defense will remain the core purpose of the Alliance” was very contentious – there were some nations who did not consider collective defense as the core purpose of the Alliance any longer and wanted expeditionary tasks to become the primary focus for NATO. Yet others argued that the nature of Article V itself is changing – it is no longer about the defense of Allied territories and population but rather crisis response and peace keeping outside NATO borders. The Central and Eastern European allies were the most vocal about the continuing importance of the Article V as ingrained in the Washington treaty. The heated debate resulted in a compromise provision that collective defense will remain the core purpose.

While the public debate on the credibility of collective defense is rather passive, there is a lively discussion on Lithuania's participation in international operations. The official line to substantiate Lithuanian foreign deployments is based on two lines of argument: 1) “NATO in Lithuania, Lithuania in Afghanistan”; 2) Lithuania's defense now starts in Afghanistan. The emerging critique of Lithuanian foreign adventures centers on the questions of 1) relevance of Afghanistan and Iraq to Lithuania's defense; 2) ability of Lithuania to undertake and sustain demanding missions, given the country's limited financial and military resources.

Mismatches and solidarity

The political debates have certain repercussions on the defense planning and military transformation.

As a NATO member, Lithuania had to reassess her military threat assessment. Reaching an agreement on multinational threat assessment requires a political consensus and most allies inevitably have to adjust their national assessments to make that consensus possible. There is a different degree of a terrorist threat in the UK and Lithuania, as there is a different likelihood of a Russian fighter intruding into the Portuguese airspace as opposed to Lithuanian one. These mismatches must be compensated by the Allied solidarity in the cases of actual crisis. The very belonging to the collective defense alliance should lessen the degree and likelihood of the actual or perceived security threats.

Consequently, Lithuania had to review its defense posture. In the early nineties, building on the assumption, that Lithuania would have to fight alone against a superior enemy, Lithuania copy-pasted the Nordic-style total defense concept (encompassing large, conscription-based armies, large reserves, total mobilisation, etc.) into national military planning. Having acceded a new NATO, which is fighting new threats, most elements of total defense appear to be irrelevant or even in conflict with what is necessary for the Alliance. Lithuania has to build upon an entirely new set of defense planning assumptions: Lithuanian armed forces (LAF) will not have to fight alone, but as a part of Allied force; LAF will share the burden of Allied commitments worldwide - it is no longer about the defense of Lithuanian borders but the collective defense of NATO; and, consequently, Lithuania will no longer have to build all-around armed forces for a full-

scale military stand-off.

These new assumptions imply a radical shift in overall planning approach: from the threat-based planning, entailing preparation for a total war by each country, to a capability-based approach – the entire Alliance having the right set of capabilities to deal with any challenge from low-intensity humanitarian aid missions to high-intensity expeditionary warfare. This shift is only possible if the commitment of all Allies to collective defense is unshakably credible.

New assumptions require a breakthrough in strategic thinking. Somewhat slow progress of defense transformation in Lithuania may signify either caution towards the credibility of collective defense or unwillingness of the military establishment to carry out painful downsizing in favor of technological modernization, which is pre-conditional for LAF to be able to undertake much more complex missions than before: ensure deterrence and defense of entire Alliance by partaking in Article V operations and contributing to Allied crisis response operations.

These tasks require more professional troops, modern technology, advanced logistics capabilities, joint and combined approach to operations. While words “transformation” and “expeditionary” are always used simultaneously, there is an increasing concern about the collateral damage this has on domestic role of the military. While deployment of troops in operations has often more to do with foreign policy than homeland defense, the military are losing visibility at home. It would be difficult to prove to a common Lithuanian that engagements in Iraq or Afghanistan are national defense affairs. Lithuanian statesmen thus face a difficult challenge of reconciling the country's international commitments with the human security needs of their own citizens. The discourse on “the global war on terrorism” or reconstruction of Afghanistan does not strike a chord with Lithuanians who themselves live in poor rural areas, feeling utterly insecure and uncertain about their future.

Related to the latter problem is the issue of conscription, which did fit nicely into the plans of total war. Today, however, conscripts are of much less use when it comes to international deployments and operating high-tech weaponry. On the other hand, losing conscription to transformation also means losing a key link between the society and the armed forces.

New tasks require new capabilities. When NATO was preparing for total annihilation war, the priority was development of heavy combat capabilities. In the new environment, NATO finds itself lacking in logistics capabilities. Nations need to make difficult decisions to scrap sexy toys – tanks, fighters, artillery – in favor of trucks, field kitchens and laundries. The concern for smaller nations is over-specializing: turning any nation's armed forces into one niche capability, such as water purification, even if it would cover all the needs of NATO, would be unthinkable.

For troops to carry out demanding tasks in operations, they need to be well equipped. Acquiring modern capabilities is a costly endeavor. Lithuanian defense budget remains extremely limited. The defense planners must undertake difficult balancing act: on one hand, there are the ever-growing international commitments of Lithuania, which puts a strain of running operational costs on defense budgets. On the other hand, there are burning investment needs to get troops ready and equipped for subsequent deployments and other tasks.

Against the backdrop of the challenges discussed above, the EU's ambition to develop its own defense clout added a new dimension to the defense transformation agenda. For quite a while Lithuania's military have been living in accordance with NATO calendar: implementing IPAP and MAP; participating in NATO operations and PfP

exercises; catching up to NATO training and equipment standards etc. Not surprisingly, the launch of ESDP in '99, was not enthusiastically welcomed by Lithuanian defense community. EU aspirations to have autonomous defense policy were seen as potentially detrimental to the transatlantic link and NATO. In addition, Lithuania did not see the EU as a military power, which could guarantee efficient deterrence let alone defense against a major conventional military threat.

Challenge and transformation

Given the overall context of strategic dilemmas, public debates and implications for defense planning Lithuania has to deal with, the following conclusions may be offered:

- First, there is an increasing tension between the historical nature of Article V (collective defense against major aggression) with all the resulting military requirements, and a new strategic environment of unclear adversaries and asymmetric threats, which call for a different understanding of security and a different approach to defense policy and planning;
- Second, Lithuania is in a paradoxical mental trap: Lithuania can only pursue military transformation and new approaches to defense planning only if it believes in/have reassurances of credibility of the good old Article V, because its vision of security is still constrained by the image of a major conventional threat from the ever dangerous East. But the agenda of a transformed NATO does not feature that kind of threat;
- Third, the language on importance of collective defense and Article V in the new strategic concept (if there will be one) may well be the same as in the Washington treaty, but for all practical purposes, it already has a slightly different meaning. However, it does not necessarily mean that Article V is less binding or less credible.

Norwegian Perspective

Openness to change

J. Peter Burgess

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When a Norwegian F16 dropped two bombs over Afghanistan in October 2002 it was the first use of Norwegian military force since the end of World War II. Norway's defense has traditionally been structured as an 'invasion' force, with a focus on national defense, in particular attentive to the key geographical position in immediate vicinity to Russia and a long Atlantic coast. The post-Cold War transformation from a territorially based national defense to an out-of-area strategic culture has been a difficult and sluggish one in Norway. A combination of a relatively underdeveloped strategic culture and a strong tradition of humanitarian and development aid has made difficult the security-development synthesis so characteristic of the new security thinking of our time. The relatively unique combination of historical, geographical, natural and cultural properties proper to Norway's recent cultural, political, and strategic history invite a distinct interpretation and approach to the changes in NATO's strategic identity.

Expression of Autonomy

As a small power, Norway has never had a strong tradition for strategic thinking in foreign policy. Since the turn of the 20th century foreign policy has generally taken the form of a balance of alignment and neutralism. As an expression of autonomy Norway has remained outside of the European Union, while at the same time engaging in transatlantic alignment through NATO membership.⁴

This balance has changed as a consequence of two important developments (disregarding for a moment the changes brought on by 9/11). First, Norway has followed the path of the development of both the European Economic Area and the Schengen arrangements. This has brought with it an increasing institutional inevitability: a one way street toward integration. Secondly, the EU itself has taken institutional and political choices directing it toward a more consolidated military and foreign policy identity. Norway has unavoidably and largely unwillingly been carried along in this development.

Already in the 1980's the geopolitical question of a Norwegian 'choice' between the US (in the form of the transatlantic alliance) and Europe was guiding debates amongst experts. The Cold War assured that security in its conventional understanding took

⁴ (Neumann, 2002: 20; Neumann & Heikka, 2005).

priority over economic interests represented EU membership or association. From the EC referendum of 1972 all of Norway's NATO partners, with the exception of Turkey and Iceland, had become EU members. When in 1994 Norway again voted to not seek EU membership the political stakes grew. The debate was revitalized and expanded.

In the mean time the 1992 NATO resolution that the Alliance could take part in peace operations under the supervision of OSCE represented, particularly in Norwegian eyes, a shift from a defensive, militarized Cold War force to one inclined to value and put into focus the social and cultural determinates of the conflict and post-conflict peace-keeping.

Already in the Cold War environment NATO naturally began to evolve. The institution of the Partnership for Peace in 1994 placed unique pressure on Norway. The notion of including the satellites of the Russian federation created uncertainty for Norway which shares a border to Russia, the arch-enemy of only years earlier. In 1997 NATO stepped into its role in the Balkans. NATO's role changed – from supporting the UN Protection Force to a central implementation force (IFOR) of the Dayton Accords. Norway was also originally engaged in the Balkans in the service of the UN. It might be said that the new Central European EU members have gotten the best of two-worlds: an alliance with the US and thus security in relation to a still somewhat unpredictable Russia through NATO, and access to the European markets with their ideology of free movement of goods and services.⁵

Blurring of distinctions

Through the entire post-WW II period Norway has cultivated a foreign-policy identity as peace-maker, as a globally-minded, environmentally pacifist.. In the Norwegian geopolitical imagination, avoiding the use of military force is not only desirable, it constitutes the primary foreign policy aim of foreign policy. The evolution of the threat in the post-Cold War period has thus brought about challenges for the Norwegian way of looking at the world. The blurring of distinctions between war and peace, friend and foe, the post-national nature of threat, the rise of societal and human security as global issues have caused something of a crisis for Norwegian strategic thought, while in the circles of track II diplomacy these have remain strong, even become consolidated.

The 1999 conflict in Kosovo came close to being a direct political crisis in Norway. Though the Norwegian political class had followed closely the evolution in NATO's identity and portfolio of tasks since the Rome meeting in 1991, the drama of Kosovo and the role that the Alliance attempted to play in solving it were closely linked in the Norwegian political imagination. Thus the Foreign Minister in a speech on 3 September 1999 could evoke a 'historical test of an expanded NATO' only 4 months after the adoption of the New Strategic Concept. In that speech the Foreign Minister characterizes the use of force by the North Atlantic Alliance as a failure of the primary task of conflict avoidance. Resorting to force was to be construed as a failure, even if it met its political ends.⁶ The new NATO shift to a mixing of war-making and peace-making tasks, causes myriad political challenges in the Norwegian ethos. NATO's New Strategic Concept in this sense makes Norway's branding of itself as a peace nation more problematic, both in terms of everyday domestic party politics and in terms of foreign policy.

The challenge of security today has only slight resemblance to 50 years ago. The task related to security have become more related to questions of risk management, crisis management and peace. Thus one obvious question is whether NATO is the proper on

⁵ (Udgaard, 2005: 19)

⁶ (Vollebæk, 1999).

the ground tool for these kinds of activities. Given Norway's traditions and, not the least, self-branding, as peace nation as an alternative to traditional NATO-led military activities there is a more or less important clash of geopolitical identities involved.

On the one hand since Norway is a small and relatively weak member of the NATO alliance, Article V has been of particular importance from the point of view of defense. Norway would clearly be incapable of defending itself from threats coming from any of its immediate or more distant European neighbors. It is thus entirely dependent on the provisions of Article V. The security dependence also affords a dimension of creates policy independence. The distribution of defense resources is naturally co-determined by the freedom to distribute resources in other ways. On the other hand, the post-war pacifism that dominates political debate has given the status of a full-blown engagement of Article V the status of a disconcerting thought. The case in point is the political debate surrounding the Norwegian participation in the present military operation in Afghanistan, to which we return below.

Solidarity rather than assistance

The Norwegian Parliament responded swiftly and comprehensively to the Washing declaration of April 2006 with a full analysis of the meaning and implication for Norwegian foreign policy. A Parliamentary Communication lays The official Norwegian reaction to NATO's New Strategic Concept is most distinctly.⁷

Norway supports initiatives from NATO to shape a role for the evolving security identity of the European Union. This has involved most directly a division of labor which would give the EU responsibility for crisis response and management. In Norway's vision, this mandate should be interpreted and applied broadly, giving considerable room for maneuvering. Redundancy in military structures should be avoided.⁸

The Norwegian perspective continues to give US participation in crisis areas considerable significance. The Kosovo example is underscored in official documents as primary proof for the need for strong US involvement. If one accepts the pragmatic and general aim of strengthening the Alliance for a new era, then US competence and experience should quite simply be taken on board. In this sense the Norwegian official perspective sees Kosovo as the test and concretization o the 10 years of the NATO evolution starting with the run-up to the Rome meeting. Kosovo was also a central moment for linking the aims, interests and competencies of NATO, the EU and the UN, through the 1998 Security Council resolution 1199 authorizing airborne operations and Resolution 1244 giving the mandate of the KFOR operation.

Given the historical and political background to Norwegian debate these UN mandates and the legitimacy they provided were of utmost importance for Norway. The reference to international law and to UN resolutions was and remains central in both public debates and in government policies and actions. Norway has been positive to the expansion implicit in the Partnership for Peace. Russia's reaction to the 1999 Kosovo campaign was seen in Norway as regrettable.

In addition, Norway has been active in attempts to increase the overall NATO budget in order to give more flexibility in absorbing new members of the Alliance.

The official Norwegian reaction to the New Strategic Concept has been to seek balance between new tasks and old. Norway does not consider the need for NATO and its capabilities as by any means obsolete. At the same time, Norway has shown openness

⁷ (Parliamentary Communication nr 36, 2000).

⁸ (Parliamentary Communication nr 36, 2000: 3).

to change. The one clear condition that the Norwegian government wishes to see reflected in discussions about the New Concept is the centrality of the UN in forming policy on crisis management.⁹

Clearly, NATO's NSC had immediate repercussions for Norwegian defense.¹⁰ A secondary yet real political challenge involves the very *legality* of sending of dispatching Norwegian freely conscripted troops to zones of conflict that do not imply the defense of Norwegian national sovereignty. The logic of conscription, in Norway as elsewhere has always been based on defending the nation to which the conscripted soldiers belong. The counter-argument made in conservative Norwegian circles is that the common denominator between now and then, between the friend/foe logical of Cold War geopolitics and the blurring of aid, peacemaking and conflict is distinctively *moral*: In this sense Article V of the NATO charter expresses a *moral solidarity* more than a material assistance. (Parliamentary Communication nr 36, 2000) According to this point of view, also attributed to Joschka Fischer, the aim of NATO must be to maintain the visibility of the political community originally (and continuously) represented by NATO.

The new challenges for NATO arise from new types of conflicts: ethnic, religious, etc., these arise, according to the President of the Norwegian Parliament, Jagland, from the borderlands of Europe.

Speculations and responses

The Iraq crisis has been a challenge for the UN, the EU and NATO. The political and moral capital that the US was capable of gathering in order to served to consolidate power and marginalize the role played by international law and coordinated military action in and through NATO. The transatlantic alliance was deeply split by divergent positions on whether to engage and, how to engage, in Iraq. In 2003 NATO took over operations in Afghanistan. The latter also manifest deep disagreement about what the role of NATO should be.

Norway has 750 troops deployed across the globe. Of these, 532 are in Afghanistan. On the basis of a request from NATO, the Norwegian government recently resolved to send 150 more special forces to the Kabul region. This has caused tension in the present governments since one of the members of the government coalition, the Norwegian Socialist Party, explicitly opposes deployment. Indeed, the resolution was seen as a direct defeat for the Centre-left government, bringing some to speculate that the government would collapse.¹¹ Others went as far as to declare the failure of the NATO-policy in Afghanistan.¹² The death of a Norwegian special forces soldier in July 2007 has only increased popular resistance against the Norwegian participation in the action. There is a clear sense in political circles that, should resistance to the occupation reach a critical point among other forces, such as the German, a critical mass for withdrawal could easily be reached.

Norway is the second largest gas producer in Europe after Russia. Energy security is thus an anchor point in Norwegian foreign and security policy. This was a central theme when Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga met her homologue Jonas Gahr Større on the 23th November, 2006.

For this reason, the comments by US Senator Richard Lugar, and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on NATO's role in defending the 'energy security' of the

⁹ (Parliamentary Communication nr 36, 2000: 11)

¹⁰ (Børresen, 2000; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2004)

¹¹ For example, Dag Seierstad (Horn, 2007a).

¹² For example, Sverre Lodgaard, Director of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (Horn, 2007b).

alliance attracted particular attention in Norwegian circles. In related news reports it has often underscored that Poland is particularly interested in an arrangement whereby energy security became a focus of the Alliance. NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is often evoked as supporting such an approach.¹³

Norway, again, has a special relationship to the question of energy security, different from other members of the NATO Alliance. The Norwegian Foreign Minister has been careful to point out the degree to which energy policy is a central focus of the present government and the degree to which need to 'safeguard the interface between foreign policy, energy policy and climate policy' is in focus.¹⁴ Negotiations with Russia on access and environmental care for the Barents region are ongoing.

¹³ For example (Nilsen & Renå, 2007).

¹⁴ (Støre, 2007).

Slovak Perspective

Transatlantic orientation

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In the past years, the Slovak foreign and security policy has been tied more to NATO membership than to the security and defense dimension within the framework of the EU. As a rule, security policy and defense policy has not been properly differentiated from each other in respective foreign and security policy documents.

It was, among others, Slovakia that was meant in the report of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on NATO enlargement already in 2002: “Finally, we were convinced, as have been many US Government officials, that the seven countries seriously under consideration for NATO membership, in addition to the three new members of NATO, are more committed Atlanticists (with the possible exception of Slovenia) than many of the current NATO allies.”¹⁵ This US Senate Committee’s assumption has ensued clearly from both the documentary basis of Slovak security and foreign policy, as well as from practical steps the Slovak Republic implemented in the Trans-Atlantic dispute, especially between 2002 - 2006.

In any case, under any circumstances

In the course of security sector reform (during the NATO integration process), both security, and military policies tended to the extension of Article V beyond the NATO area.

The strongly pro-US foreign and security policy of Slovakia as the reaction to a period of almost anti-US foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in the 1990’s.

The years 1994-1998 meant a relatively anti-American foreign policy position assumed by the populist-nationalist-leftist government. At this time, a security and military policy was strongly opposed to any reconsideration of the classical NATO defense strategy – Slovakia’s participation in peace-keeping extremely low. After the parliamentary elections of 1998 the Slovak government turned to be strongly “pro-interventionist” in the following years.

Thus, 1998 brought to an end a period, in which the US Government had openly criticized the policy of the Slovak Government and had limited the official contacts with

¹⁵ *Report of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, Washington DC, August 30, 2002, p. 3.

Slovakia to a minimum. In the official Report on Meeting the Goal of the Slovak Foreign Policy for 2001 with the Outlook to 2002, USA is already seen as a „strong ally“.¹⁶ In the Report the relations between Slovakia and the USA are described as having reached the “best level in the hitherto history of bilateral relations” and the relations of Slovakia to USA “will preserve their foreign policy priority”.¹⁷

Following the parliamentary elections in September 2002, the pro-interventionist foreign policy has been confirmed and intensified. The reason should be seen in the fact that the government was formed of the right-of-the-center parties that had claimed partly a strong engagement of Slovakia in world affairs. With the exception of KDH (Christian Democratic Movement), which has been strongly anti-communist, but not explicitly pro-NATO, the other three parties either did not focus on foreign policy (liberals from ANO – Alliance of a New Citizen) or supported openly a pro-interventionist course (SDKU – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union and SMK – Party of Hungarian Coalition).¹⁸

After the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, the Slovak government elites obviously lived under the impression of the invitation to NATO and the issue of Transatlantic „values“ was underlined: “Now, Slovakia has a government that will not hesitate to take a principal attitude, if the question of values is in the game”.¹⁹ Especially at the time of the Iraqi crisis, the policy of the government was distinctly pro-interventionist and in favor of an extension of Article V beyond the NATO territory. It seemed to express best the US view how “New Europe” should behave in times of crisis. Prime Minister M. Dzurinda was upholding strong statements of support for US policy until 2006. With regard to possible solutions to the Iraqi crisis, at a time of European hesitation prior to the Prague summit, the head of Slovak government had been explicit: “*Slovakia is and will be a firm, strong ally of the United States of America. In any case, under any circumstances.*”²⁰

This was, practically, a *blanc cheque* for everything the US was going to do in the world in military actions, regardless of the attitude of the world community (UN). Practical steps – sending a unit of Slovak soldiers to Kuwait by the decision of the National Council of the Slovak Republic – followed in February of 2003. Until 2007, Slovakia kept more than 100 soldiers in Iraq (only 11 officers remained in February 2007 after the change of government’s policy).

Two priorities

As to the new Minister of Defense, after taking the office in October 2002 he presented his “seven priorities”, two of them touching the EU-NATO relationship. The first has been the ESDP, but “strictly within the framework of NATO” (which openly meant preferring the half-forgotten ESDI), the second priority having been the participation of Slovakia in the fight against international terrorism and participation in peace-keeping missions.

Constituent parts of this strategy were:

- Building-up flexible and rapidly deployable forces;
- Increasing the number of national contingents serving in peace-keeping operations;

¹⁶ *Správa o plnení uloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky za rok 2001 a zameranie na rok 2002*, in: Report of the Government of the Slovak Republic no. 1419, 2002.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 14.

¹⁸ See in: *Zahraničná politika SR vo volebných programoch politických strán* (“The Foreign Policy of the SR in Election Programs of Political Parties). Bratislava, SFPA 2002, pp. 12 – 14 and 31 – 32.

¹⁹ The Slovak PM M. Dzurinda, in: <http://www.sdkuonline>, November 10, 2002.

²⁰ Press Conference of the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Bratislava, 22 November 2002.

- Reducing the number of Slovak troops under NATO command at the cost of troops under UN command;
- Politically, an almost unreserved support for NATO and/or US-led peace-enforcement missions beyond the Article No V was expressed: notable examples already Kosovo (99), but also Afghanistan and Iraq.

The warm governmental attitude towards CFSP/ESDP has continued up to 2006, when the new government (a coalition of the leftist SMER, the HZDS of the former PM V. Meciar and the nationalists from the Slovak National Party) called for the reassessment of direct military support of the USA in Iraq.

Measured against the development in Slovak security and foreign policy after Summer 2006 (after the parliamentary elections held in June), the attitude of the Slovak government to the war in Iraq has had also a clear connection to the discussion about Slovak position to the CFSP/ESDP in previous years. It has to be said that the position of Slovakia (both government, and the parliament) changed rapidly compared to the stance assumed in 2003.

In 2003, out of the seven parliamentary parties, totally negative voices were heard only from the Communist Party of Slovakia. The HZDS (Movement of the former PM V. Meciar) and the SMER have not taken such an outright negative position against the war in Iraq. In this voting, however, neither the government nor the opposition (with the exception of Communists) were able to form a unanimous position. The majority of Christian Democrats (KDH) voted against, whereas a large part of the oppositional Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) voted in favor of sending Slovak troops to Iraq even without a UN mandate. The then oppositional SMER party (since June 2006 the strongest government party) was also split in the voting.²¹ During the parliamentary discussion about keeping the troops in Iraq following the proposal of the Communist Party of Slovakia to withdraw these troops in June 2006, the chairman of the SMER party (and Slovak PM since July 2006) voted for the withdrawal with a lot of arguments, which proved to be partly incorrect afterwards. Some of the arguments were ideological (Slovak government is „servile“ towards the USA, the Iraqi provisional government is a „puppet government“²² and its call for international help resembles the call for international /i. e. Soviet²³/ help in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, allied forces use inadequate military power in Iraq, the war was a violation of international law, the Slovak government was „lying“ about the situation in Iraq).

The new interpretation

The „Iraq discussion“ reflects an attitude to the new interpretation of the Article V and has been of importance for several reasons in Slovakia:

First, since the very beginning it was seen as a test for Slovakia's orientation either to US or EU (CFSP), whereby the participation in Iraq was regarded as not fully compatible with the CFSP.

²¹ Out of 141 present MPs, 81 voted in favor of sending troops to the crisis Middle East region (Kuwait) and only 54 were against. 6 MP's abstained. In the parliamentary discussion, as well as in the public it was clear, however, that the decision has been about "sending the troops actually to Iraq" and expressing support for US foreign policy against some of EU allies. In: *Parlament poslal vojakov na Irak* ("The Parliament sent soldiers to Iraq"). In: <http://www.svet.czsk.net/clanky/sr/vojacisrarak.html>.

²² This claim has become obsolete in between due to the UN SC resolution No. 1546/2004 and became further invalid after the parliamentary elections in Iraq, after which the Iraqi government became "legitimate".

²³ Remark by the author.

Second, shortly before the parliamentary elections in 2006, the (afterwards) largest government party announced the „immediate withdrawal“ of Slovak troops from Iraq with the claim that the Iraq war was not in accordance with international law.

Third, in Summer 2006, the new Slovak government announced the intention to withdraw the Slovak troops from Iraq and used similar arguments as in the parliamentary discussions in 2003 and 2004. Anyway, the specification of an „immediate“ withdrawal disappeared. Instead of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic announced a continuity of foreign policy saying that there would not be an „immediate withdrawal“.²⁴ In spite of this, the bulk of the contingent was withdrawn in 2007 and a new anti-interventionist policy was announced:

“In the future, Slovak troops should take part only in those military operations, which are undisputed, promise >100% success< and >make sense<” (PM Fico in February 2007)

And *fourth*, the reassessment of the presence of Slovak troops in Iraq means the reassessment of Slovak „atlanticism“ generally just due to the fact that the top officials of the present government (headed by the PM) have always brought the Iraq involvement of Slovaks in connection with CFSP (see above).

Fifth, it becomes, however, open how the government will react to a possible new UNSC resolution on Iraq. If the UNSC prolongs the presence of international military forces in Iraq at the end of 2006 (which seems probable) for another year, Slovakia – as a non-permanent UNSC member for 2006 – 2007 will have it very difficult in calling for military help for Iraq and withdrawing from there at the same time.

Crucial ally

This field was (and has remained up to 2007) the most emotional and “ideologized” part of the Slovak security agenda.

In 2001, the first Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic was adopted in the National Council of the Slovak Republic by overwhelming majority (102 MPs out of 117 government and opposition MPs present endorsed the document). From the aspect of the perceived dichotomy between the CFSP/ESDP and transatlantic links, the USA is called the “crucial strategic ally of the Slovak Republic”. Other parts of the strategy include successful perspective of continuing European integration; acceptance of a common European defense under the conditions that it will remain a part of transatlantic defense; continuing prospects of transatlantic defense including further enlargement of NATO and EU by the countries of Central and East Europe; Slovakia as a perspective part of both integration units, would pursue enlargement of the peace and stability zone in Europe as a matter of course; treatment of the nearest neighbors (mainly Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), but also other key foreign policy partners from the position of an active member of both integration groupings; the decision to take up standpoints on transatlantic discussions and discussion about the Transatlantic and Euro autonomous defense.

In sum: this strategy reflects a period of „interventionism“ in Slovak security and foreign policy prior to the events following the changes after September 2001 and 2003 (military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq).

²⁴ Kubis: *Zahranicni politiku slovenska vlada menit nebude* (“Kubis: The Slovak Government will not Change the Foreign Policy”). 13. 7. 2006. In: http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/kubis--zahranicni-politiku-slovenska-vlada-menit-nebude_90443_8snek.html.

Since 2005, the new Slovak security strategy has been directed by the same basic starting points as the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic adopted in 2001, which also became a platform for the strategy of responsibility of the Slovak Republic for national, regional and international security for several years to come. In the new security strategy (2005), it becomes clear that NATO has been regarded as the basic framework of reference for official Slovak security thinking. It is necessary to say that official security strategies of the Slovak Republic have been recommended by the government and had to be adopted in the Parliament.

Practically in each passage dealing with security, NATO has been given “sequence priority”, i.e. the EU only follows NATO being mentioned as the basic guarantor of security for the country. In this security strategy:

- NATO (not EU) has been presented as “guaranteed security and instrument for the implementation of Slovakia’s security interests”.
- In context with the EU, Slovakia pledges to support joint negotiations between NATO and EU as expression of “strategic partnership”.
- NATO should be the main forum of policy and security cooperation between its European and North American members.

These obligations are important from the point of view of a subsequent pledge to CFSP in the same document. Slovakia wants to:

- Implement the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU
- Strengthen capacities of the crisis management with the goal to contribute to EU-led operations and missions
- Act in accord with the solidarity clause and provide help for countries exposed to terrorist threats
- Support the development of European Defense Agency and involve the Slovak industrial and technological capacities in the European defense industry.
- Support the building of capacities within the European Security and Defense policy, if they are compatible with NATO capacities.

The “transatlanticist” strategy has been also anchored in official foreign policy documents. In the *Mid-Term Strategy of the Slovak Foreign Policy 2005 – 2014*, the USA has been called the “crucial foreign policy partner of the Slovak Republic”.²⁵ The document arises from the fact that with accession to NATO and EU (in this sequence!) the country fulfilled its key foreign policy priorities. The fact that the country is institutionally anchored in common political and economic space of the EU and, at the same time, enjoys firm security guarantees of NATO, created a hybrid framework for security vital interests and Slovakia has identified itself as integral part of civilization heritage of Europe and North America. According to the document, the fundamental and long-term threats to stability and prosperity of Slovakia include terrorism, unsolved conflicts beyond the boundaries of the enlarged EU, organized crime, illegal migration, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The protection vis a vis these threats has been seen in transatlantic orientation. The document considers NATO to be a crucial security forum. It definitely distances itself from projects of building European autonomous security structures that might weaken NATO. The country’s consistent „Euro-Atlantic“ orientation is enhanced by defining the US as a strategic partner.

²⁵ *Strednodoba strategija slovenskej zahraničnej politiky* (“Mid-Term Strategy of the Slovak Foreign Policy”), Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, September 29, 2004. In: <http://www.vlada.gov.sk>.

Anyway, at the time the strategy was discussed, some analysts were expressing the view that consistent adherence to this line might bring certain problems from a long-term perspective.²⁶

These „long-term“ problems appeared with the change of government in Summer 2006. In the election programs of political parties, as well as in the platform of the new government (The Manifesto of the Government), both political parties, and the new government did not have any other chance as to respect the above mentioned documents regarding the attitude to the CFSP/ESDP and the formulations were very cautious.

In this respect, a clear contradiction between official and still valid documents on one side and real politics on the other side has been visible since 2006/2007. Although all official documents like Mid Term Strategy of Slovak Foreign Policy (2004) or Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (2005) have emphasized the importance of transatlanticism and the USA for Slovak foreign and security policy, since the second half of 2006 there has been a blatant discrepancy between the declamatory documentary obligations and the real political output toward several international problems, which directly or indirectly concern NATO - especially Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq.

²⁶ Samson, Ivo – Gabelova, B.: *Zodpovednost za medzinarodnu bezpecnost* (“Responsibility for International Security”). In: *Zahranicna politika po vstupe do NATO a EU: Vychodisla a strategie* (Slovakia’s Foreign Policy after the Accession to NATO and the EU: Premises and Strategies”). Bratislava, SFPA 2004, p. 46.

Turkish Perspective

Nature and spirit of the Alliance

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The issue is whether Article V can still effectively guarantee the security of the North Atlantic area against new threats. Today terrorism, crimes against humanity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, diseases and epidemics are among the phenomena affecting our security and well-being. Turkey is exposed to all these threats. Throughout the Cold War years, Turkey was in the front lines of the Soviet threat and was face to face with Soviet divisions and missiles. Even in that environment, however, we recall being left out in the “cold” in the 1960’s by our NATO partners against a possible Soviet attack, though we had not requested any such action from our Allies. We lived a similar experience in 1991 in face of a possible retaliatory attack by Saddam against Turkey. It is therefore appropriate to take a close look at this Article and to consider its relevance in the changed security environment.

Dampening impact

Today Turkey sits at the epicenter of major on-going regional conflicts, whether in the Middle East, the Caucasus or the Balkans and is confronted with the entire range of transnational issues, including and especially terrorism. Turkey is traditionally a security-conscious and security-sensitive country. This is why we Turks are perhaps more acutely aware of the critical importance of Article V than even others in the Alliance. Hence, how the Article V issue is dealt with in the current setting is of crucial significance for Turkey.

Article V’s detractors argue that until 9/11, this provision was “dormant” and that after 9/11 when it was finally appealed to; its results were less than convincing. When in 2001, the North Atlantic Council invoked Article V; the military operation led by the USA in Afghanistan was not an Article V undertaking. The USA did not request support from its allies. At best it was a NATO blessing for a USA-led effort. So the argument goes.

The development and growth of the political dimension of NATO and the increasing importance of its non-military activities may also have had a dampening impact on the immediacy of Article V. In the post-Cold War era, in the absence of imminent or even likely Article V scenarios, the Alliance has been mostly preoccupied with non-Article V operations, entailing mostly crisis management activities conducted outside its traditional area.

In short, the international setting and NATO habits and behavior in recent years appear to have pushed Article V to the back burner, notwithstanding the fact of its being invoked after 9/11.

Nonetheless, I would still propose that Article V maintains its relevance in light of the strategic realities of our times. It is quite likely that the frequency of its use will increase in the future. Its implementation will be effective only to the extent of its harmonization with the new security challenges Alliance members face today. The 1999 Strategic Concept fully recognized that the nature of threats and risks to the Trans-Atlantic community had radically changed. The Allies stated that although a large-scale conventional aggression was unlikely, the security of the Alliance remained subject to a variety of evolving risks. At their 1999 Washington Summit, Allies confirmed that “any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles V and VI of the Washington Treaty”.

Article V received its first real test with 9/11. NATO’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was substantial. Following the decision to resort to Article V, NATO’s first deployment took place in the framework of Operation Eagle Assist, in which 13 NATO nations patrolled USA skies for 8 months. Another measure was Operation Active Endeavour where NATO ships started patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping. Active Endeavour was later expanded to a wider geographical area and taken outside the domain of Article V. The success of this operation, attests to the fact that Article V can serve as an instrument and a catalyst of durable security arrangements in countering new threats.

No place for misconception

Some analysts tend to believe that Turkey might have a negative attitude regarding Article V. They point to what happened in 1991 when Turkey agreed to open its bases for air strikes against Iraq and simultaneously inquired about consultations within Article 4, thinking of an Iraqi retaliation. That some Allied governments failed to respond positively to the Turkish initiative, this school of thought concludes, left Turkey skeptical about Article V.

There is surely some truth to this analysis because the 1964 Johnson letter episode and the 1991 experience made Turkey less certain about solidarity in the Alliance. But it did not alter the Turkish view point that its national security and defense depended on and were enhanced by a strong NATO. There should be no misconception, therefore, on the importance that Turkey attaches to Article V. Turkey has not ever officially requested that this Article be invoked. On the other hand, Article IV, which stipulates that consultations among Allies may be held upon request, has been invoked on several occasions.

Actually, Turkey is very much attached to Article V and considers it to be the linchpin of its force structure and a guarantee for the Alliance’s credibility and military effectiveness.

In this context, it is important to note that Article V was invoked for the first time after 9/11, as a response to a terrorist attack. In Turkey, this was widely applauded as a demonstration of NATO solidarity against terrorism which was finally accepted and recognized as a challenge that necessitated a response at the Alliance level. Of course, there is no way to escape the irony that Turkish efforts for NATO to identify terrorism as an Alliance issue were for years treated with skepticism and resistance by our partners. 9/11 changed all that. The Turkish public wishes to see NATO more aggressively engaged in combating terrorism,

It is the understanding in Turkey that Article V is the exclusive domain of the member states. While we support the establishment of partnership links with countries around the world who share NATO's values and goals, we believe that the collective defense commitment is for members only and that partners are entitled only to what might be decided by the NATO Council.

A more generous use of Article V in the future might be necessary. To this end, member countries ought to develop habits and reflexes of working together under Article V.

Values and goals

Discussions on Article V are also closely related to NATO's enlargement. As NATO expanded Eastwards over the past years to embrace former Warsaw Pact countries, some argued that the collective defense clause was no longer applicable and that it might not be employed for every Ally. Other analysts also spoke of a "regionalization", implying that concerns of Allies in a given region might not necessarily constitute a threat to allies in another region, resulting in the non-application of Article V.

In our view, enlargement and Article V commitments should not be seen as antagonistic. Allies, including Turkey, have rather seen NATO enlargement as an opportunity to extend the deterrence and security guarantee provided by Article V to a wider area. In this context, the Baltic air policing mission, although not meant to address any particular threat, was a good example of Alliance solidarity being mobilized for countries that joined NATO in the last enlargement wave. New NATO members have in turn supported NATO-led contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

NATO expansion calls for a word about Russia here. The recent stiffening of Russia is essentially the resurgence of its traditional power politics impulses, triggered by the rising utility of its oil and gas resources. Even if NATO had never expanded, Russia would still be posturing against NATO today. With its rising wealth and prosperity, Russia is going to be more assertive. If therefore Russia is ever to pose a threat to anyone, then NATO expansion is a sensible policy.

New needs and new ideas

Discussions on Article V's relevance in the new security environment bring forth new ideas and needs. One is the area of energy issues. During the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006, US Senator Lugar urged that energy security be covered by Article V.

Of course, the question of energy security is not new on the Alliance's agenda. As early as 1999, it was recognized that NATO's security interests could be affected by the "disruption of the flow of vital resources".

On this matter, Turkey believes that each country is responsible for the security of energy infrastructures and transport lines located in its own territory. On the other hand, given the ever increasing importance of this issue, it is also opportune to explore the added value of the Alliance's assistance in the field of energy security upon request of the interested country.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that despite the changing international security environment, Article V remains a unique security guarantee in the North Atlantic area. Although the 1999 Strategic concept is already starting to age, it can be expected that any updating of this concept will maintain the primacy of Article V, which has been

...serving as the backbone of the Alliance's success and credibility for nearly 60 years. What the Alliance needs to do is to identify existing and emerging threats and risks, ascertain whether they are relevant in the sense of Article V and develop strategies and methods for dealing with them.

In terms of accomplishing its mission of safeguarding the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means, NATO has been a success story. It has also demonstrated a sustained capacity to transform itself in a coherent matter. NATO is still a regional organization, but there is no question about the fact that its outlook is today global and its area of operations is constantly expanding. The future of NATO may to a large extent depend on how Article V is adapted to changing security and defense needs.

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Questions and commentaries to the presentations delivered by the panelists allowed for an elaboration of the views represented by them.

Tadeusz Chabiera from the Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw, asked what Poland's reservations towards the present condition of NATO consist in. **Bogusław Winid** explained that national restrictions, so-called caveats (regulating the rules of engagement of particular states' forces), in the operations in Afghanistan – which are being introduced also by countries applying for NATO membership – may be a cause of concern. Fulfilling the obligations arising from its membership in NATO, Poland follows the rule of the “solidarity of allies”. However, the introduction of the mentioned national restrictions may lead to breaching of the foundations of this solidarity.

Andrzej Karkoszka from the Academy of National Defense asked why ambassador Logoglu had not mentioned the recent case when Turkey was let down by NATO security guarantees – namely when it requested the deployment of Patriot missiles, fearing that Iraq may fire missiles with unconventional warheads after the outbreak of the war in 2003? Addressing P. Burgess, he reminded that during the Cold War Norway was one of the countries encompassed by the Alliance's procedures of contingency planning. This should have resulted in Norway having “obligations in return” to a certain extent towards the Alliance, while from Burgess's words it seems that the Norwegian public opinion is currently not particularly in favour of NATO. Karkoszka asked whether the reason for this could be the fact that the largest threats have been averted.

Osman F. Logoglu said that in Turkey the predominating view is that NATO should react to any threat to the security of one of its member countries, hence also in the case of energy security, although it is impossible to predict what such a reaction would consist in. According to Logoglu, the refusal of deploying Patriot missiles to Turkey proves that Turkey's arguments are not always met with understanding from Western European institutions. Stressing the need of adapting Article V to new challenges in the area of security, Logoglu drew attention to the fact that this process may not be detached from the question of NATO enlargement. From Turkey's point of view, defending the integrity and power of NATO mechanisms is of foremost importance, although this does not mean that Turkey opposes to the development of the European Union's military capabilities. These capabilities may not, however, be constructed in opposition to or at the expense of NATO. Ambassador Logoglu confirmed that Turkey demonstrates increasing anti-American sentiments coupled with a decreasing support for the country's EU accession. However, according to him, it is difficult to speak about

a dramatic change in Turkey's foreign policy – cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions is of a strategic nature.

Prof. Cornel Codita, Dean of the International Relations and European Integration Department at the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, Romania, who was also participating in the conference, said that after the optimism of the 1990s which predicted a significant improvement of security, the current fears of the international community about security are not smaller than during the Cold War. This optimism allowed for carrying out certain changes in the functioning of the security institutions of the Western world, including NATO. However, following the September 11 attacks, pessimism began to dominate in international discourse. One of the factors that make it difficult to predict the development of the international situation is Russia's conduct, although Moscow's policies in essence reflect the attempt of preserving the country's position in the hierarchy of world powers, especially *vis-à-vis* the United States.

The real reason, and at the same time a solid justification of why the contemporary situation is unpredictable, is the fact that many political decisions are made on the basis of ideological premises. This also pertains to NATO's decision-making process – it is assumed, among others, that the Alliance will use armed forces to resolve conflicts and, afterwards, it will support nation-building, i.e. the creation of national structures and institutions the task of which will be peace-keeping. However, NATO lacks the means necessary to realise these plans.

According to professor Codita, the current understanding of Article V is incorrect. Article V defines the world by dividing it into two categories – an area where an armed attack may take place (and the response will be the use of force), and an area in which there are more possibilities of reacting – peacebuilding, peace-keeping missions, etc. The problem, however, is that taking actions in the second area, the Alliance still uses instruments characteristic for the first one. As a result, the effectiveness of NATO operations is limited.

Andrzej Karkoszka, who was appointed as the former deputy Minister for National Defense, asked the panellists to define to what extent Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania may fulfil the obligations of Article V. He also asked to judge the current relevance of Article V.

Ivo Samson from Slovakia pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish the original understanding of Article V from the present-day interpretation. The former – a commitment to undertake collective actions in case of an armed attack on one of the members of the Alliance – is accepted in Slovakia widely and without reservations. Meanwhile, the present-day interpretation of Article V – the readiness to take part in operations in areas not encompassed by the provisions of the Treaty – is manifold, as the new government of Slovakia has announced the country will only participate in such missions that guarantee success and “make sense”. According to Samson, if NATO is to continue to play its role of preventing the import of insecurity, it should strongly engage in exporting security to the entire world. This foresees the necessity of reinterpreting Article V by each member of the Alliance that treats its membership in NATO as the main line of its national security policy.

Kestutis Paulauskas explained that Lithuania has no choice but to have faith in the effectiveness of Article V. An alternative to that, tested in the past with not the best results, was a policy of neutrality. The rationale for such faith is the fact that the force of Article V was sufficient to discourage the USSR from aggression. At present, the deterring force of Article V does not have to be considered with such great threats or challenges. Paulauskas also said that as NATO decided to provide support for Kosovo

and Afghan nationals, it is difficult to imagine it would not do the same, should the security of any of the members of the Alliance be threatened.

Peter J. Burgess said that from Norway's point of view, NATO, after having approved the new Strategic Concept in 1999, is evolving in the right direction and is seen as a useful instrument in Norway's security policy. If the issue of having no significant enemy will be solved once and for all, its usefulness will further increase.

Marcin. Zaborowski from the European Union Institute for Security Studies asked how one ought to interpret Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's statement – NATO's Secretary General said that the current state of UE-NATO relations resembles a "frozen conflict" and that the two organisations should divide their tasks in the following manner – tasks linked with civil activity should be handled by the EU and those requiring the use of force – by NATO.

Paweł Pietrzak, from the Department of International Security Policy in Poland's Ministry of National Defense, asked the panellists about their predictions, should the ISAF mission in Afghanistan become a failure and, in particular, how this would influence Article V.

In **Kestutis Paulauskas's** opinion, the division of tasks as suggested by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has two levels – the political and practical one. On the political level, NATO declares a full readiness to cooperate with the EU. The predominant view in NATO, however, is that the EU will not completely engage in a strategic dialogue with NATO until it can be certain of the power and efficiency of the European Security and Defense Policy, i.e. when it matches NATO as far as its operational capabilities are concerned – the EU will then not be in the position of the weaker partner. As far as the practical level is concerned, the situation of countries that are members of only one of the two organisations (NATO or the EU) seems to be the biggest problem. According to Paulauskas, solving both problems is only a question of time and of working out certain mechanisms. Such mechanisms will inevitably be developed, because NATO and the EU have cooperated or are cooperating in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan.

Ivo Samson judged that if the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan will end in failure, it will be necessary to re-determine the character of the entire Alliance. This would be the first failure of the Alliance since the beginning of its existence. Its consequences would be important, but are difficult to predict at present.

According to **K. Paulauskas**, failure is not an option. The Alliance's stand towards the first offensive of the Taliban troops will play a key role for the mission's success (and for NATO's future).

Marek Garztecki, PhD, from the Polish Academy of Sciences asked the panellists to give concrete examples of changes in the organisational structure of the armed forces in the various member countries which reflect changes in the perception of threats from traditional ones to the so-called asymmetric ones.

According to **Osman F. Logoglu**, in Turkey there is a perception that adaptations need to be made to the changing conditions of the security environment. Such adaptations consisted in reducing the size of armed forces and a gradual increase of making the army professional.

Peter J. Burgess explained that the Norwegian Ministry of Defense developed a new strategic concept in 2005. It reflects the growing interest in so-called asymmetric threats, but most of all concentrates on the issue of societal security, i.e. providing security for the country's social structures.

Prof. Codita drew attention to the fact that the question of capabilities may not be viewed in an abstract manner, but in connection with the goals of the security policy, with the characteristics of the planned mission (e.g. its duration).

According to **Kestutis Paulauskas**, the Alliance's system of defense planning is currently a complex construction, using several smaller mechanisms, often differing in the terminology used. The biggest challenge consists in a necessary change of the way of thinking about capabilities – accepting that, with an increase of the number of out-of-area operations, it is the logistic capacities and not strictly the combat capacities that are gaining significance. The key to success is becoming not the force of the troops' fire, but the capability of ensuring a sound functioning of the troops in regions that are several thousands kilometres from one another, as in Afghanistan. The transformation of Lithuanian armed forces, adapting their structure and catalogue of missions to the evolution of threats to the country's security, consisted in reducing the number of combat brigades from ten to one, followed by changing the profile of the armed forces' tasks. While before the reform, the majority of tasks consisted in territorial defense, after the reform they encompass humanitarian and peacekeeping missions as well.

Dr Samson noticed that the discussion on the issue of capabilities focuses on two key issues – soft power and hard power. In his view, Europeans seem to be more in favour of the use of soft power, in other words the possibility of influencing participants of international relations by instruments other than military ones – primarily economic instruments. He also reminded that the term “soft power” is an element of a broader concept of complex interdependence, which makes the efficiency of soft power dependent on the ability to convince the partner/opponent about the existence of a common system of values in the mutual relations. The events connected with Iran's nuclear programme prove that the lack of such common values makes soft-power instruments inefficient, which in turn leaves no alternative other than the use of hard-power instruments.

Capabilities are essentially linked with the financial means the countries have at their disposal. At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, the allies declared that their expenses in the area of security and defense will not be inferior to 2% of their respective GDPs. Many countries, including Slovakia, have not only failed to meet this commitment, but have gradually been diminishing their contribution (in 2007 it will be of 1.62% in Slovakia). According to Samson, there is no common vision of defense against new types of threats that would be shared by all the NATO member countries. This results from a different perception of capabilities required to counter these threats, and particularly the role that should be played by soft and hard power.

Central European Perspective

Feasible NATO

Władysław Stasiak
Head of the National Security Bureau²⁷

The theme of “NATO and EU in the Security Policies of Central-Eastern European States” is of crucial importance. Circumstances are such that any discussion must take into account the future both of NATO, as an organization with particular traditions and objectives, and of the European Union, as well as the mutual relationship between the two bodies, which ought to share a common vision of security policy. A Central European take on the challenges connected with the future of NATO and the EU’s security and defense policy is especially interesting, and joint reflection on these issues is extremely valuable and desirable, constituting an important contribution leading to the drawing of reasonable conclusions as regards the future conduct of Central European states. And that of the two aforementioned organizations.

Different type of threat

In view of the above, I would like to put the following points up for discussion. NATO remains the forum for debate, and good debate at that, though at times difficult, of course, evolving in directions which are not always to everyone’s satisfaction. This is by no means to deny such debate its purposefulness. It is thus excellent that NATO provides such a forum. However, in order to fulfil our dreams and satisfy our vital needs NATO must be something more than that. It is only in such a context that we speak of the practical possibility of implementing Article V of the Washington Treaty. I hope there is no doubt that Article V is and should continue to be the pillar of NATO’s activity and the true test of the organization’s feasibility, the tightest nexus binding member states.

Besides regarding Article V as the Alliance’s cornerstone, we should also remember that while protecting its “inner territory” NATO must also pay close attention to what remains “outside” of it. As regards moving beyond its area in order to defend it, there is no controversy. Relations must be maintained, cooperation forged. Cooperation is desirable, but this should not mean consent for certain recurrent, and somewhat irresponsible proposals to transform NATO into another UN. Is this what future has in store for NATO? Would such a new version of NATO, replacing a strong organization, be capable of defending the interests of its members?

²⁷ In August 2007 Mr. Władysław Stasiak was appointed the Minister of Interior and Administration of the Republic of Poland.

Let us consider this question in the context of energy security. For now, the situation is such that at the NATO summit in Riga the Alliance's brief was extended to cover energy security. If so, then this declaration needs to be given substantive content.

We know full well that the dimensions of crisis management and defense of critical infrastructure are gaining ground within NATO structures, and are becoming better understood. This aspect ought to acquire especial importance from NATO's viewpoint. In such case, shouldn't securing continuity of supply, defense of transmission infrastructure be deemed an indispensable element of broader security? Could cutting off supplies, or shutting down installations constitute a *casus belli* for the implementation of Article V? I believe that this is the right question to pose, even though at this stage there is no clear answer in the offing.

But the principal question is: What do we read Article V as posting? Defense and mutual support *par excellence* in the military sense, or something more, with the broad 9/11 context inevitably springing to mind? How ought mutual support to be construed in such a case? This is a vital quandary that concerns us all: How is Article V related to our countries' energy security?

How shall this and other similar issues bear on the future of the North Atlantic Alliance and on understanding of our shared concern for its members' security?

We all know that a common energy policy constitutes one of the more crucial elements implemented within the European Union – however, the interrelation between EU concern for energy security and its perception by NATO remains unresolved. This certainly is one issue that is worth considering.

In the main, this involves the problem of the so-called asymmetric threats, which has gained currency of late. In this context, we should consider Article V's "implementability". I wish to propound the thesis that reflection over the future of NATO from its members' perspective ought to focus precisely on this "implementability" of Article V, or on the potential for its proper interpretation, its practical purport.

Global NATO

Should Central European states support giving the North Atlantic Alliance a global dimension? Our region has no superpowers, our countries have no interest in involvement in Asia Pacific or elsewhere. Still, I do not see how Central Europe could remain oblivious to the vision of a global NATO. The processes of globalization touch all of us, so disregarding them would be highly improper. However – and herein lies the heart of the matter – should NATO become a global security institution? In other words, should it address global threats, and if so, in what way?

Security policy is linked to an important question about the North Atlantic Alliance's stabilization forces and the European Union's initiatives. Poland is actively engaged in such missions. The NATO operation in Afghanistan, irrespective of opinion on Polish involvement, demonstrates to what extent NATO is feasible. In this case, we are not dealing with implementation of Article V – of this we are well aware – but with verifying to what extent is NATO able to implement diverse and complex endeavors which pose a daunting challenge.

Missions such as that in Afghanistan lead us to the question which, as I see it, was one premise of the thesis offered by minister Witold Waszczykowski: that "NATO is not our dream alliance,"²⁸ i.e. to what extent is NATO capable of effectively running diverse

²⁸ This quotation from Poland's deputy foreign minister comes from an exchange of ideas during a seminar on the possibility of Polish involvement in the American anti-missile defense system and was

operations? I believe that mission can be treated as a way to “corroborate” NATO’s role as primarily its own members’ security system, or security organization, as well as its potential for mission planning.

Matters stand likewise with missions under the aegis of the European Union. The Althea mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, where Poland participates, the mission in Macedonia or those under the UN banner (Congo, Lebanon). They shall all lead us to raise questions whether the EU or other organizations possess the practical capacity to carry out security and defense tasks. Which is why I am convinced that we should all keep a watchful eye on such missions – and their results and conclusions.

Opening up in the right direction

Polish perspective on the future of NATO and the EU is as follows: We do not want to see these institutions as rivals, as we do not think that there is any fundamental disagreement between them, nor that anyone should be forced to make strategic choices in favor of just one of them. We should take care to develop NATO capabilities and discuss the Alliance’s future shape, so that the 2008 summit can end with resolutions that shall determine its future for years to come, still paying close attention to security’s European dimension. It is impossible to speak of effective security or efficacious security system without underscoring its Euroatlantic, Transatlantic purport. Poland is involved in both NATO-led enterprises, in partnership with the United States, and in creating EU battle groups. The first Battle Group is set to become operational in 2010. The EU’s Visegrad Battle Group is also on the horizon.

From the vantage point of Central European states, it is crucial that any security system, and NATO in particular, exist and function feasibly. At the same time the organization, now numbering 26 members, must not be closed off. For the Republic of Poland’s security policy it is of paramount importance that both NATO and the EU become agents of extending stabilization. It seems a spurious contention that only such countries can become members that first attain complete stability and put in order their internal systems. Of course, some degree of internal stability and democracy is necessary. Were Albania, Macedonia and Croatia to accede to NATO in 2008, we will be able to speak of opening up in the right direction.

In my opinion it is also important that we do not neglect eastern security policy. This is significant not only to Central Europe as an entity of sorts, but to the functioning of both organizations. In particular, I have in mind opening doors for such countries as Ukraine or Georgia. I do not think that this should have any detrimental effect on third countries’ security, which is why we treat with all seriousness the notion that enlarging NATO and the EU is a stabilizing factor and not action against Russia.

Tadeusz Chabiera (Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw): First question: How specifically can energy security be guaranteed by NATO, with some procedure in case of supply cuts, and if so, what would such a procedure look like? And secondly, the issue of a global NATO. It seems to me that if NATO were to move beyond its territory and act out-of-area, then it would naturally seek partners around the world. If Japan and Australia have long been involved in the anti-missile shield project then I don’t understand Polish objections, especially seeing that thanks to the missile defense system – on a global scale – facilitates control of Russian activity. Third, in the present situation, when it appears that Russia is becoming less and less democratic, is it not the

interpreted by the media as a critique of NATO. The seminar, organized by the Center for International Relations, Business Centre Club and Euroatlantic Association, took place on March 1st 2007 in Warsaw—note by Maria Wągrowka, CIR.

case that spurring various conflicts within the EU and NATO actually benefits Russian policy aimed at dividing Euroatlantic organizations and weakening them?

Władysław Stasiak: I don't think that Poland, or organizations to which it belongs, is looking for areas of conflict with Russia. Installing the anti-missile shield is connected to NATO membership to the extent that Russia has raised concerns about accepting new candidate countries which it views as a factor purportedly destabilizing the situation in the region and directed against Russian interests. Meanwhile, it appears that reverse is the case. Neither of our countries is seeking any conflict whatever with Russia.

Poland does not hide the importance it attributes to our relations with the United States, but I don't suppose this could plausibly be labeled as a policy of aggression against Russia. As a country, Poland is not spoiling for a fight with Russia. The problem lies in the fact that the dominant stance in Russia still views Central Europe as a sort of "transit zone". I believe that if we were to reach an understanding, to explain to each other once and for all that it is not a transit zone, that Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary are EU members in measure equal to Great Britain, Portugal or Germany (I mean in principle, not with regard to potential), then we would have progressed in our mutual relations with Russia.

I would like to strongly emphasize that in our NATO and EU activities Poland is not looking for areas of conflict with Russia, and nor, for that matter, is any other country. It is more a question of explaining that Central European countries are NATO and EU members like all other members of these organizations. And this is probably the most significant problem in our relations.

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Following the NSB Head's address **Olaf Osica** of Natolin European Centre raised the question of specific political gains stemming from Poland's NATO membership. In his view, for the past several years Poland has been "giving the Alliance more than it is receiving." It is participating in ISAF, supports the creation of a nascent NATO energy policy, though pundits indicate that possible positive effects of such policy shall not have any direct positive effect on Poland. O. Osica underscored that the point is not to repudiate the thesis about NATO's key role in Polish security policy, but to find a clear answer to the question of what are real, "tangible" benefits of Polish membership in the Alliance.

Professor Stanisław Koziej of the National Defense Academy pointed out that after 2001 key players on the global arena, to wit the USA and the EU, have redefined their conceptions of security, while the pre-eminent notion within NATO dates back to before that year. The Alliance is not witnessing any significant internal strategic debate or formulation of some new idea. The question is: Should Poland initiate such a discussion? Is shirking such debate not a mistake?

In response to Olaf Osica's query, **Bogusław Winid**, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland, emphasized that NATO is the cornerstone of Polish security policy and NATO membership constitutes an enormous asset for Polish armed forces, principally in the context of their transformation, and for the Polish economy (NATO investments). Were it not for NATO membership, Polish defense budget would have to be double of what it is today. Only such high expenditure could guarantee the availability of forces and means to counter hypothetical threats. NATO membership is also a factor eliciting speedier implementation of reforms aiming to increase mobility and expeditionary potential of the armed forces, and to ensure that they possess capacity for rapid deployment to regions where NATO is active. If Poland

were not a NATO member, claims professor Winid, it would have to focus on developing its territorial defense capability.

Diverse Missions

Istvan Gyarmati²⁹, one of the guests attending the seminar whose second part was devoted to the security policies of Visegrad Group countries, pointed out that NATO is still perceived as the best instrument of security policy. However, the approach to utilizing this instrument have undergone a certain change. Now, it is the character of the mission that determines who shall partake in it (mission defines the coalition), while hitherto it was in fact the coalition of states that decided what mission to undertake (coalition defines the mission). This second principle obtained during the cold war years, when the “mission” consisted in preventing aggression by Warsaw Pact countries. At the time, there was but a single, constant coalition – NATO itself. The post-cold war era this principle ceased to hold, with coalitions becoming temporary. It ought also to be borne in mind, noted ambassador Gyarmati, that Article V of the Washington Treaty does not in actual fact oblige NATO member states to undertake any specific steps in case an armed attack on the territory of another member state – each country is free to act as it sees fit.

From Hungary’s viewpoint, says Gyarmati, there is no dispute as to the fact that terrorism is a global threat, and the American diagnosis of this issue is accepted. At the same time, however, Hungary lacks a sense of immediate threat from international terrorism – if Hungarian do in fact engage in its elimination, that is because they regard it as their obligation to their allies. In return, they expect above all that their own perception of Russian foreign policy shall not be judged inaccurate or unrealistic. In ambassador Gyarmati’s opinion, the people of Hungary have every reason to view this policy in negative light.

The Hungarian representative deemed it a crucial function of NATO that it provides a forum for debate. However, he added that the organization is not fulfilling this role in an satisfactory manner, as exemplified by the discourse over the Alliance’s strategic conception. The decision making process is becoming increasingly lengthy, as was the case with equipping the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with additional materials. NATO discussion should serve strategic dialogue, especially over divergent threat perceptions. Strategic dialogue shall not be equivalent to allied solidarity, but it ought to facilitate thrashing out definitions of missions NATO would engage in, and the attendant procedures.

Ambassador Gyarmati asserted that Central European states could try to exert pressure and force their view of security matters both within NATO and the EU by using extant Visegrad Group structures. Yet this potential for unified efforts is in abeyance, largely due to countries focusing on their own particular interests. In his opinion, another possible factor is Poland’s drive to become regional leader in Central Europe, which does not always meet with approval among its partners.

To end, ambassador Gyarmati asked how plausible is it that all key contemporary European security issues – energy security, the situation in Kosovo, plans to build elements of the missile shield in Europe – be discussed in the context of formulating a uniform strategy in regard to Russia. This could constitute a response to Russia’s generally acknowledged policy towards Europe, conducted in the vein of “divide and rule”.

²⁹ This symbol indicates that pursuant to the assumptions of the May 17th conference entitled “NATO and EU in the Security Policies of Central-Eastern European States” there were no prewritten addresses, and only voiced remarks by guests from the Visegrad countries.

In the Backdrop – Classic Threats

Dr Ivo Samson* explained that one distinguishing feature of public discussion over security policy in Slovakia is a high degree of polarization, evinced by difference of opinion, e.g. between the defense minister and Slovak NATO representatives. Hence, in describing Slovakia's stance on the issue of Central European security, one can only refer to official, binding state documents, and in particular to Slovakia's 2005 National Security Strategy.

Traditional "classic" threats are still conceived as the backdrop against which security policy is shaped – the possibility of a large-scale conflict is not discarded. However, it is threats from international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that constitute priorities, in accordance with discernable trends in the thinking about security-related matters in the USA and the EU, Slovakia's key international partners.

An Effective Consultation Mechanism

According to **dr Jiri Schneider*** in analysing Czech security ideas it is necessary to admit that strategic decisions in this domain, pertaining for instance to purchase of military equipment, are not essentially compatible with the purport of crucial policy documents outlining Czech Republic's foreign and security policies. This results largely from the fact that over the past 17 years these documents have not been harmonized, frequently going so far as to contradict one another. This necessitates careful scrutiny of Czech strategic documentation, with the caveat that Czechs set great store by documents and guidelines of diverse alliances, above all NATO's. In J. Schneider's opinion, this is evidence for the frailty of Czech strategic culture.

The speaker also underscored that Czech Republic's membership in NATO is not dictated solely by the wish to attain security guarantees as they are enshrined in the provisions of Article V of the Washington Treaty. Prague views the Treaty as a certain whole. All the while, noted J. Schneider, Czechs greatly appreciate the mechanism outlined in Article IV, to wit that of consultation. An efficient consultation mechanism is a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of Article V's security guarantees.

A Common Strategy Towards Russia

Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former foreign affairs minister of the Republic of Poland, sees joint efforts to formulate a common strategy towards Russia as the most significant challenge for Central European states. Russia's policy dictates treating the region's states on an individual basis, in each case stressing different aspects. Both NATO and the EU fail to grasp the objectives of Russian policy, and incorrectly assume that the two bodies are capable of shaping and instigating Russia's democratization. Democracy is always "an internal product", ensuing for the most part from changes to a given society's mentality. Such processes can only partially be stimulated from without. Professor Rotfeld concluded that an EU political strategy which in any way opposed the United States, would constitute a "disadvantageous" scenario. America's becoming disinterested in the security of the entire European continent would be an undesirable outcome for Central Europe. The region's countries ought to engage in a debate over what they themselves can offer to global security.

Professor Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, head of Institute of Public Affairs, claimed that a noticeable lack among Central European states of a fully fledged strategic culture may stem from the fact that local public debate does not consist in reaching consensus on crucial matters. It has been deemed a success of public debate that no one calls into question NATO membership. The 1990s prevailing consensus over NATO accession

has in effect been “transposed” onto contemporary reality and consists in shoring up support for membership in the Alliance. However, a discussion over NATO’s future is conspicuous by its absence, in particular as regards the shape of NATO-EU cooperation and elements of a new strategic conception.

Professor A.D. Rotfeld also asserted the claim that Central European states perceive NATO as a protective umbrella, yet simultaneously regard through the prism of the characterization proffered by Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general: NATO’s role is to keep the Germans down, the American in and the Soviets out. Poland’s former top diplomat maintained that it is the second of the three components that has retained greatest currency, i.e. American involvement in guaranteeing Europe’s security. The year 1997 was the turning point which saw the emergence of a new quality in relations with Russia in the domain of European security.

Dr Ivan Krastev of Sophia’s Centre for Liberal Strategies admitted that Bulgarian public opinion remains largely ignorant of the country’s involvement in international missions (Bulgaria has sent troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan). This makes debate over such missions’ evaluation criteria all the more urgent. During the cold war, shaping security policy was qualitatively different, with a clearly defined enemy generating an immediate threat. At present, precisely for want of an antagonist, formulating criteria of victory is made more difficult, with in turn hobbles public debate over involvement in missions beyond one’s own borders, or those of the Alliance viewed as a whole.

Bulgarians frequently note that the American Missile Defense project does not envisage extending its activity over Bulgarian territory. This, it is claimed, stands in stark contradiction to one of the more potent arguments used to justify Bulgarian membership in NATO, to wit that the Alliance’s preeminent function is to ensure equal protection for all its member states.

A Question of Interpretation

Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller of GMF US office in Berlin drew attention to the fact that contemporary debate over Central European security is beset by the problem of interpreting how this security is affected by Russian policy. This is apparently evinced by differing judgments over whether “traditional” threats persist, or should greater emphasis be placed on a new types of risk and to other dimensions of security, including that of energy supplies.

Dialogue with Russia is made all the more difficult in view of the fact that the country is undergoing multifarious complex internal processes. German debate has focused on whether, and if so, to what extent can these developments be influenced. C. Stelzenmüller noted that among the part of German public opinion which allows for such a possibility the dominant view is that this can only be achieved on the condition that mutual relations are tightened.

NATO and EU in the security policies of Central European states

Warsaw, May 17th, 2007

Points for discussion

The following questions result from the debate on the importance of Article V of the Washington Treaty, stimulated by the Center for International Relations and conducted within the framework of Center's activities. As such, they may be regarded as a contribution to the ongoing disputes at various NATO forums and in the NATO member countries.

- 1) Have the major - i.e. 'traditional' - threats to the security of Central Europe been decisively and permanently neutralized, or should their re-emergence – possibly in a different form – be taken into consideration?
- 2) Is it possible and necessary to adopt common definitions of threats? Would this new definition be indispensable for the endorsement of a new security strategy of the Atlantic Alliance, or will the content of documents adopted during the Riga Summit, stressing the importance of asymmetric threats (terrorism), suffice?
- 3) What is the exact rationale behind the argument that the participation in NATO's expeditionary missions, reaching outside the area foreseen in the Article V, enhances the security of Alliance's member-states?
- 4) In what way could NATO become an instrument suitable for countering threats to energy security?
- 5) In view of the current condition of NATO, do the Visegrad Countries (Central European states) have concurrent or differing doubts as to the functioning of the Alliance?
- 6) Is the efficiency of existing mechanisms intended to ensure defense of NATO member-states satisfactory, or should contingency planning remain a constant feature of the functioning of NATO?
- 7) Can the current military capabilities of the Alliance be regarded as sufficient both for ensuring defense of member-states and for carrying out successful expeditionary missions?
- 8) Is the argument that NATO transformation should proceed only under the condition of preserving the predominance and credibility of Article V, acceptable to all members of the Alliance? How should the role of Article V be defined, so that the Alliance will be able to tackle various future threats?
- 9) What is the level of readiness of Central-European states – Visegrad countries and Germany, in particular – to fulfill of the obligations associated with Article V of the Washington Treaty? What could they offer to their Allies, should a need for assistance arise?
- 10) What will be the consequences of hypothetical failure of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, in particular – to what extent would it lower the credibility of Article V?

- 11) Do bilateral agreements, such as an expected agreement between Poland and the US, strengthen or weaken the Alliance and European cooperation?
- 12) What are the key findings of the ongoing debate on the ways and means of cooperation between NATO and the EU in ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic area? Should the “division of labor” between these organizations be such that the EU would focus on civilian activities, while NATO would be responsible for missions involving the use of military force?
- 13) Is the dilemma, resulting from the fact that some actions of the Russian Federation have a negative impact on the security in the region – regardless of the existence of strategic Russia-NATO relationship, shared by all Central European states?

Center for International Relations (CIR)

CIR is an independent, non-governmental, 12-year old think-tank, dedicated to the study of international relations and those foreign policy issues, which are of crucial importance to Poland, Europe and transatlantic relations in both the long and the short-term.

CIR carries out its own research projects, prepares reports and analyses and participates in international projects in cooperation with similar institutions in several countries.

CIR has also founded the Foreign Policy Club – an influential forum for foreign policy analysis and debate, involving hundreds of leading politicians, diplomats, civil servants, local government officials, academics, students, journalists and representatives of other NGOs.

OUR GOALS ARE:

- ❖ to create a Polish 'foreign policy community', involving politicians, civil servants, diplomats, scholars, business people and journalists, who by force of arguments influence the thinking about foreign affairs in Poland and abroad,
- ❖ to deepen the knowledge of international relations in Polish society,
- ❖ to influence the understanding of the goals of Polish foreign policy among the political and diplomatic elites in other countries as well as to make Polish leaders aware of foreign policy objectives of other countries.

OUR SPONSORS: We acknowledge with gratitude that a number of projects implemented by CIR have been sponsored over the years by:

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Poland
- The Ford Foundation ■ The German Marshall Fund of the United States ■ The Robert Bosch Stiftung ■ The Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland ■ The Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

JANUSZ REITER, former ambassador to Germany, founded the Center and was its head for ten years since its establishment in 1995. Following his appointment as an ambassador to the USA, Mr. **EUGENIUSZ SMOLAR** was nominated the new President since October 2005.

EUGENIUSZ SMOLAR, President of CIR, was actively engaged in the democratic opposition and was a political prisoner in the 1960s. He was expelled from the University of Warsaw and from 1970 onwards was in exile: first in Sweden and since 1975 in the U.K. He worked as a journalist and was for many years the director of the Polish Section of the BBC World Service. Following his return to Poland in the 90s, he was Vice-chairman and Program Director of Polskie Radio S.A. (public radio), as well as Senior Fellow at CIR.

CIR's vice-presidents are: **DR. JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ**, former minister of defence and former vice-president of the European Parliament, at present Vice-Chairman of its Foreign Relations Committee and **Professor JERZY KRANZ**, former Ambassador to Germany.

CIR Program Board is made up of eminent public figures: prof. Jan Barcz, amb. J.D. Bindenagel, dr Henryka Bochniarz, dr Zbigniew Brzeziński, dr Erhard Busek, prof. Jerzy Buzek (former Prime Minister), prof. Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, dr Daniel Hamilton, prof. Ludger Kühnhardt, prof. Zbigniew Lewicki, dr Andrzej Olechowski, prof. Wojciech Sadurski, prof. Fritz Stern, dr Hanna Suchocka (former Prime Minister), dr Jan Szomburg, prof. Jan Zielonka.

For several years, the Center has prepared “Reports & Analyses” in which it publishes research concerning important current events in international affairs. They are available on our website (www.csm.org.pl) in Polish and English and are sent out by e-mail to many personal and institutional recipients in Poland and abroad. CIR’s research enjoys great interest of members of the Polish Parliament and of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Several books were edited by CIR and were published in Polish, English, German and Ukrainian.

CIR experts often appear in Polish and foreign media as commentators on current affairs.

Activities of CIR in 2006/2007 have been concentrating on the most important issues of international relations and Polish foreign policy, which were executed in the framework of the following programs:

- the European Program,
- the International Security Program,
- the Migration and Internal Security Program,
- the Eastern Program,
- the Marshall Memorial Fellowship Program,
- the Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program.

Our main fields of activity last year included:

- EU’s Eastern Policy incl. the European Neighborhood Policy of the European Union;
- Monitoring the political situation in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine – from the internal and foreign policy point of view of these countries, including relations with the EU and the USA;
- German-Russian relations and their significance for Poland and Europe;
- The ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU;
 - The Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in the light of the Constitutional Treaty,
 - European Union in 2007 – the end of the crisis?
- Transatlantic Trends – presentation and debate over GMF US annual research,
- The changing role of NATO;
- The role and influence of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO and the EU;
- Transnational migrations, their influence on the European labour market and internal security in the context of EU enlargement;
- Transatlantic internal security agenda and dilemmas for European migration policy.