



Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych  
Center for International Relations

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*Greg Austin, Bartek Nowak (eds.)*

## **The United Nations And World Security Order Reform: Next Steps**

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**Report on a one day workshop organized jointly by  
The Center for International Relations (Warsaw)  
The Foreign Policy Centre (London)  
The Asian Century Institute (London)  
The World Security Institute (Brussels)**

**The workshop took place in the European Parliament, Brussels, on April 24th 2006, and was financially supported by the ALDE political group**

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**CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

ul. Emilii Plater 25, 00-688 Warszawa  
TEL.: (22) 646 52 67, FAX: (22) 646 52 58  
[www.csm.org.pl](http://www.csm.org.pl), [info@csm.org.pl](mailto:info@csm.org.pl)

**Initial Aim of the Workshop:** To bring together researchers and governmental specialists to review the scope and planning of the project under the joint leadership of the *Foreign Policy Centre* (London), the *Center for International Relations* (Warsaw), the *World Security Institute* (Brussels and Washington) and the *Asian Century Institute* (London). One output of the meeting was to be an agreed action plan for work over two years in the three clusters (sovereignty, WMD and human security). The meeting was set up to canvas the appropriateness of convening a special international conference of states on the progressive codification of international security law and consider alternative approaches to forging a new global consensus (e.g Poland's New Political Act). The meeting also aimed canvas the modalities for reform of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

### Notes on editors:

**Dr. Greg Austin** is Director of the Asian Century Institute. Formerly he served as Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Centre (London). For six months in 2003, he led a team of 12 specialists reviewing UK conflict prevention policies. From February 2000 to January 2002, he held senior posts, including Director of Research and Director of the Asia Programme, in the Brussels and Washington offices of the International Crisis Group. He has held posts in the Australian National University, Bradford University (Peace Studies), the Australian Commission in Hong Kong, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in the Australian parliament. He has also worked as a Ministerial adviser in the development cooperation and defence portfolios, as an intelligence analyst, and as foreign affairs and defence correspondent for a leading Australian newspaper. He has undertaken consultancies for several governments and the European Commission. He is the author of *China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development* (1998); co-author of *Japan and Greater China: Political Economy and Military Power in the Asian Century* (2001) and *The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia* (2000); editor of *Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power* (1997); and co-editor of *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy* (2001). His working languages are English, French and Russian.

**Bartek Nowak**, is Associate Researcher at the Center for International Relations, a PhD candidate at the Warsaw School of Economic, he has also completed his Executive Studies at the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government in managing political and economic reform (2005). He has an MA in Political Science (University of Silesia) with his thesis on perspectives on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. He is currently working in the European Parliament as the Head of Office of EP Vice-President Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Previously he has been a Research Fellow at the Center for International Relations in Warsaw (2002-2004), advisor to Polish Members of the European Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003) and one of the leaders of the 'Yes' referendum campaign on Poland's entry to the EU. He also worked for the OSCE during parliamentary election in Kosovo (2001). Bartek Nowak is an author or co-author of more than 20 academic publications on the EU, international relations and globalisation.

## I. Outcomes of United Nations reform in 2005

### 1. General assessment

According to the unanimous view of the United Nations members, the international community is facing a *whole range of threats [to peace and security] that require our urgent, collective and more determined response*<sup>1</sup>. Yet the UN summit meeting in 2005 was unable to agree on the specific threats beyond identifying terrorism and WMD as areas of action, and beyond discussing the victims of various threats, such as women, children and ethnic groups.

It is probably fair to say that the Millennium Summit of the United Nations took no action at all to address or pre-empt any specific threat that might have lain behind their unanimous view about the urgent threats. In a year that Weapons of Mass Destruction were identified as a high priority for action, there was no answer in sight to the complete unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, evidenced in 2005 by the collapse of the review conference and in 2006 by the Bush Administration's repudiation of the NPT in its nuclear policies toward India and Iran.

In the field of peace and security, the Millennium summit confined itself either to organisational changes, including the important innovation of a Peace-Building Commission, or to very general statements of intent to carry on much as before. There was little in the Outcomes Document that revealed any evidence of a *more determined response* to the urgent threats.

### 2. Three relevant views:

*What we have seen from most of the UN's reform efforts over the years has been a preoccupation with efficiency and effectiveness to the detriment of relevance*<sup>2</sup>.

*The [General] Assembly long ago fell into the habit of adopting so many arms control and non-proliferation resolutions each year — many of them without a vote or serious debate — that the currency has become devalued almost beyond recovery. Its annual First Committee sessions [on Disarmament and Security] have become a vehicle for scoring points and voicing pent-up frustrations rather than finding common ground or having a real-world impact*<sup>3</sup>.

*The [High Level Panel's] Report only mentions the CD [Conference on Disarmament] — which has had no agreed program of work for years — once*

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<sup>1</sup> Outcomes document of the Millennium Review Summit, para. 69, The first paragraph in the section on 'Peace and Security'.

<sup>2</sup> 'Moving beyond the Reformist Impulse at the United Nations', W. Andy Knight, McGill International Review, Spring 2005, p.10.

<sup>3</sup> USIP report [http://www.usip.org/un/report/usip\\_un\\_report.pdf](http://www.usip.org/un/report/usip_un_report.pdf).

*and that single mention relates to non-proliferation (the long discussed fissile material cut-off treaty), not to any nuclear disarmament issue. The First Committee is not mentioned at all. These omissions may speak to what many believe is the irrelevance of both bodies<sup>4</sup>.*

### **3. EU failure to engage: the record speaks**

The EU failed to meet most of its specific objectives for the reform process that were laid out in 2004 and are excerpted below:

*The EU supports continued reform and revitalisation of the GA as a key element of the wider UN reform agenda. We will therefore support further rationalisation in the work of the GA Committees following the Summit. We will engage fully on areas that represent clear priorities in the UN agenda, including those where Summit follow-up action is needed. But on lower priorities, or on issues where leaders have already reached substantive Summit decisions, we are determined that in the wake of the Summit, the GA should not simply return to business as usual.” EU Priorities for the 60th General Assembly:*

*11. The European Union will participate actively and engage on resolutions dealing with the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction in accordance with its Strategy on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which includes a commitment to a multilateral approach to disarmament and non-proliferation.*

*12. The European Union will explore the possibility of establishing a relationship between the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the United Nations.*

*13. The European Union will continue to engage actively in ongoing efforts to make the work of the First Committee more relevant and to rationalise its working methods, and will work to ensure that these efforts are reflected in a common response to Resolution A/Res/58/41.<sup>5</sup>*

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew Mack, 'The Secretary General' s High Level Panel Report', Human Security Centre, <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/workshops/newyork/newyorkconcept.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> "EU Priorities for the 59th General Assembly (2004), [http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_3777\\_en.htm](http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3777_en.htm).

## II. Proposal discussed at the workshop: a reformation in international security law<sup>6</sup>.

Growing support for reform of the Security Council provides a unique opportunity to address international security concerns already addressed in this paper. States can now work towards a new grand bargain that will begin to bridge the growing gulf between - on the one hand - US and European perceptions of the international legal and political order and - on the other - those of the 'non-West', especially in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that only when these other concerns are addressed will reform of the Security Council be meaningful and durable.

In this context, there are two approaches to international security reform which need to be pursued simultaneously: the discrete, single issue approach and an aggregated, comprehensive approach.

A generalised approach to reform of international security law is now needed. It is of some note that the 2003 Agenda of the International Law Commission includes an item on *Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law*. A key example of this process is international security law.

A new approach to reform of international security law would include the following elements:

- States must now treat international security law as a unified corpus of policy and practice in need of comprehensive review;
- The UN should convene a Special Session of the General Assembly on International Security Law (The planned discussions of only a few aspects of global collective security reform during the September summit of 'Millennium plus five' was never going to be adequate);
- This UNGA Special Session should establish a standing UN Conference on International Security Law (UNCISL) with a potential life span of 5–10 years;
- UNCISL should set up working groups that address clusters of linked issues now currently treated quite separately at the intergovernmental level (for example, clustering all issues relating to weapons of mass destruction now dealt with individually as chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons. A missiles regime should also be considered in the same context);
- The International Law Commission (ILC) must take on a multi-year project of review of global collective security law<sup>7</sup> (the ILC has never

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<sup>6</sup> This proposal is based on a 2005 publication by Greg Austin and Ken Berry, *A New Grand Bargain for Peace: Toward a Reformation in International Security Law*, Foreign Policy Centre, London.

<sup>7</sup> Under the Statute of the International Law Commission, proposals for the progressive development of international law are not formally initiated by the Commission but are referred to it by the General Assembly (article 16) or by the Members of the United Nations and other authorized agencies (article 17). On the other hand, the Commission itself

addressed international security law, except for its foray – highly contested at the political level – into attempting to define ‘aggression’ more than twenty years ago);

- States must convene international conferences of specialists and policy makers to promote and inform the inter-governmental review, both at the general level and at lower levels;
- States must work closely with mobilising NGOs, think-tanks and leading scholars in a process of global and regional consultation similar to that seen in the cases of the land-mines ban or control of small arms and light weapons;

The general purpose must be to take the opportunity now presented by the prospect of Security Council reform to make a quantum advance in reducing the scope of war and war-like actions. The sort of quantum advance that can be achieved is likely to be as profound as that represented by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which outlawed aggressive war. That paradigm shift was achieved simply by a Declaration of first one state, and then many followed.

There are many specific outcomes that should be pursued in this process of a reformation in international security law. Some that we have identified include:

- A ban on economic sanctions that are not specifically targeted at named persons, governments or other legal personalities. Wide-ranging economic sanctions and trade bans are not just inhuman and outmoded. They offend the laws of civilised humanity because of their effects on the more vulnerable groups of society, including notably children;
- A ban on *permanent war* of the sort seen in the 1990s where the US and UK mounted repeated attacks on Iraq with little military or political utility. *Permanent war* of this sort is equally an affront to humanity;
- A ban on the permanent basing of military forces in another country in the absence of a direct and imminent threat of military attack.
- Provision of a Chapter VII security guarantee to any state subjected to direct attack across its borders by another state;
- New legal regimes for the protection of civilians from *collateral damage* in limited or undeclared wars;
- New legal regimes mandating targeted political sanctions for the harbouring of terrorists;

It is a key assumption in this proposal that in negotiating quite distinct areas of international security law (e.g. WMD and military basing) in the comprehensive framework, states may surprisingly find trade-offs. Developing country interest in limiting US or NATO access to foreign military bases might be traded-off or shaped to meet US and NATO interests in controlling WMD.

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may select topics for codification, although it must give priority to requests of the General Assembly to deal with any question (article 18).

### **III. Summary of workshop proceedings**

The first presentation was made by **Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld**, a former Foreign Minister of Poland and a former Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI. His remarks addressed the current state of play of UN reform and the way ahead.

#### **1. Approaches to UN reform**

**Prof. Rotfeld** described the project on the table for the Workshop as "one of the most comprehensive and intellectually provocative approaches" to the reform of international security order. He noted that by comparison, much of what had been achieved as a result of the UN reform process of the last two or so years had been too oriented to the reform of institutions without appropriate attention to the nature of the problems to be solved. He made a strong case that institutional reform should follow agreement on how the problems should be solved. He said that the test of the adequacy of reforms was how far they defined and dealt with fundamental problems.

Prof. Rotfeld described the Outcome Document from the 2005 Millennium Review Summit as a 'qualitatively new kind of document' that provided a useful departure point for further work. But it was impossible to avoid the conclusion that the security problems addressed by the various reports had not been reflected in the Outcome document. For this reason, the issue of reform of international security order was still the kind of problem that would have to be dealt with in the future.

Professor Rotfeld called for a mechanism of reform that owed less to states and more to popular legitimacy. He mentioned in this regard the work that had been undertaken by Poland in connection with framing Poland's New Political Act and the follow-up meeting of eminent persons in Warsaw. He said there was a strong part to be played by experts. States and international civil servants left to their own devices were simply a break on the reform process.

In addressing security, the next stage of reform would need to have a holistic approach (or a package approach) that deal with the three foundations of security (development, hard security and human rights) simultaneously. Yet the Outcome document from the 2005 Summit did not even address military security issues.

Prof. Rotfeld referred to the various documents and studies from the last 15 years that constituted the intellectual fund on which reform had been based. He noted that a 1991 study by Brian Urquhart "Towards a More Effective UN" remained one of the most seminal.

#### **2. Organising principles of the emerging world order**

Prof. Rotfeld expressed his view that reform must reflect the two organising principles of the emerging world order. These are:

- democratic change
- modernisation.

He noted that the UN must be seen as serving the interests of all states, whether rich or small. He remarked that the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, may be one of the few in New York who understand this sort of dynamic of the real world.

Prof. Rotfeld had earlier mentioned that it was important for India, as one of the most influential democracies in the world to be a permanent member of the Security Council.

### **3. Analysing the constraints to change**

In responding to Prof. Rotfeld, **Dr. Morten Bergsmo (PRIO)** observed that one important part of the way ahead may be to understand better how to "engage power" in the international system. To do this, he suggested it would be important to analyse the obstacles to reform.

### **4. Processes of change: the example of the ICC**

**Dr. Moreton Bergsmo**, who had been prominent in the establishment and work of the International Criminal Court (ICC), gave a detailed assessment of the experience of setting up the ICC. Having noted how most international lawyers and politicians laughed at the idea of an ICC when it was first mooted, he identified the underlying normative foundations for the court, such as the Nuremberg principles. He also noted the advances in international criminal jurisdiction made during the 1990s, beginning with the UN Security Council decision to set up a Committee of experts and followed by other measures, both within the International Law Commission and in practice (especially Security Council acquiescence in the use by a Special Representative of the Secretary General in two different missions of war crimes authority). He noted the effect of the creation of other conflict specific tribunals (ICTY, Sierra Leone and Cambodia) on acceptance of the idea of an ICC.

Most importantly for the purposes of significance reform in the international legal framework, Dr. Bergsmo identified six essential factors:

1. NGO mobilisation and unity
2. Competent, well-informed lawyers in those NGOs
3. Sufficient transparency in the multilateral process for NGOs to know what was going on (monitor, expose, lobby)
4. A few principled states, especially Germany, to protect the integrity of the idea during the bargaining
5. Adequate great power acceptance to provide hard political legitimacy (France and UK)
6. Established laboratories (ICTY and ICTR) to show that the project was feasible.

## 5. Norm promotion and declaratory law

Dr. Bergsmo noted the difference between "codification" as the concrete manifestation of existing state practice or norms of custom accepted as law and "codification" designed to be a vehicle of reform or change with a view to "positivising" a norm or ideal rather than a specific rule.

Even for new positive law to be effective there needs to be strong consensus of states to maintain the legitimacy of it. There may be daily challenges to maintaining the efficacy of the law, often as soon as a sit is created. States can control how a law is implemented by controlling staff and resources responsible for monitoring and enforcing it.

Later in the discussion, **Dr. Carsten Stahn** returned to this issue and reframed it with reference to the project under discussion, asking if we need a change in law or a change in process. He noted that the tensions implicit in the idea of humanitarian intervention might be addressed by process (i.e. a commitment by P-5 members in the Security Council not to use the veto in cases of humanitarian intervention). This intervention suggested to the project team that it really should have two strands: one looking at treaty law (positive law) and the other looking at "law made by Security Council fiat" or in some other declaratory manner (aspirational law).

## 6. Sovereignty: new approaches necessary

After a briefing on the proposed project by **Dr. Greg Austin (FPC)**, **Bartek Nowak (CIR)** introduced the issues on the reform agenda in the area of sovereignty. One of the main ideas raised by Mr. Nowak was the idea that regionalism represented a shift in sovereignty from states to the regional orgs, and not just a pooling of sovereignty. Most importantly, Nowak noted that regional organisations were proving to be laboratories for experimentation with new ways of treating sovereignty, with the practices of one regional organisation rubbing off on others.

His remarks were followed by a series of observations from **Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz**, a Vice President of the European Parliament and former Defence Minister of Poland. His main point was that "aggression" had to be better defined on a consensus basis among states to take account of such diverse issues as (state sponsored) terrorism, global electronic networks and the doctrine of pre-emption. He said that some distinction needed to be made in law between acting preventively and acting pre-emptively. The world had changed, and this fundamental concept needed to change with it. He noted that there was a long list of sovereignty issues on the table that affect security and these needed to be debated.

There was little contest to the idea put forward by Nowak and Onyszkiewicz that a patient and deep debate on the framing of the legal concept of sovereignty was needed and that such a debate should result in new formulations of law or at least of the concept. At the same time, he warned that there would need to be very tight focus in how this was approached. The

way in which the ICISS had reconciled sovereignty and human rights was a good example of the sort of tight approach needed.

Some ideas put on the table by others included:

- The emerging practice of the Security Council seemed to be heading a direction that it had some powers to determine where sovereignty started and ended where international peace and security are concerned;
- Sovereignty of one state cannot be allowed to prevent other states from intervening in cases justifying humanitarian intervention (noting the ICISS precautions);
- Sovereignty can't be allowed to mean the exclusion of an entity like Taiwan from the WHO at the same time as the world is trying to contain major pandemic threats;
- Sovereignty can't mean that China has the right to use military force against Taiwan for claims to political independence, or that Russia has the right to use force so indiscriminately against civilians in Chechnya;
- The sovereign immunity of heads of state was beginning to wither under pressure from the international community for accountability;

**Dr. Bergsmo** observed that the old concept of sovereignty is "alive and kicking". In fact, he suggested that states may now be more successful, not less so, in asserting their sovereignty against the UN because the attacks on the UN of the last 15 years might be beginning to have an effect. He cautioned that any effort to move to a different position on sovereignty would need to have political strategy behind it. He warned that there would need to be a crystal clear understanding of the relevant facts informing the principles and practices.

## 7. The EU as a special case

There was some discussion of the EU as a special case. In the view of some, it was a qualitatively different actor compared with regional organisations in other parts of the world. Given its special roles and powers as an intergovernmental organisation, **Dr. Rebekka Göhring** expressed surprise that the High Level Panel and the Outcome document from the Millennium Review Summit had ignored it.

## 8. Human Security

There was little debate around the ideas of human security raised in the briefing by Dr. Austin. Additional points worth noting were:

- The need to do something in international law to protect civilians from terrorist "exploitation" through such practices as hiding amongst civilian populations;
- There was a suggestion that protection of the environment raised human security issues that needed to be reflected in changing

international law. A particular issue raised in this regard was the possible exposure of citizens to harm from nuclear power stations.

## 9. WMD

A briefing paper was tabled on behalf of **Dr. Tomas Valasek**, on behalf of the World Security Institute. Dr. Valasek, who had been one of the co-organisers of the meeting, was unable to attend the meeting as a result of his new appointment in Slovakia's government. **Ambassador Patrick Villemur** of the French Foreign Ministry who had been accredited to the IAEA offered his insights into the issues. He was speaking in his personal capacity since he is currently on special assignment with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Ambassador Villemur framed the issues by posing the question: *do we have a problem with existing international laws or just practices?* The answer, he said, was both. He suggested in respect of the NPT, that it needed some work. There is arguably a need to include new provisions that impose a cost on states for leaving the treaty. There was definitely a burning need to strengthen export control regimes. He suggested that the only real possibility in the area of "disarmament" in the nuclear field was a fissile material cut off treaty.

On CW and BW, Ambassador Villemur noted that the legislatives were weak in both cases. In the case of delivery systems, there is no regime at all, just cooperative measures.

The main point of discussion arising in this session was the need for security guarantees and a commitment by nuclear weapons states to the principle of "no first use". The issue of the legality of WMD, as raised by the Advisory Opinion on this subject by the International Court of Justice,

## 10. Toward an action plan

In drawing some conclusions from the workshop, Dr Austin made a number of suggestions and observations:

The project should go forward with a much more focused agenda and a clearer set of objectives. One lead given was to use the emerging weight of the Security Council and its potential for declaratory law as the principal focus.

Yet, in doing so, it would be important not to lose sight of the need to rejuvenate the role of the General Assembly, especially in the field of security.

Another guiding principle would be to rely heavily on NGOs and other interest groups to allow views to influence change without relying on majority support from states. Even as the General Assembly needed to assert itself relative to the tasks and challenges and the weight of the Security Council, so did the people of the world. States could not be relied upon to bring about the much needed change.

Dr. Austin expressed his personal view that, as the HLP and Kofi Annan had suggested that the need for reform is urgent. But there is little sense of urgency in the Outcome document or what is now happening at official level. Dr Austin said that the world may be facing a Churchillian moment, accumulation of pressures so intense and destabilising that states are slowly but surely considering more military options to protect their interests.

Dr. Austin criticised the timidity of the approach of most states, not least India, in the reform process. There was a strong case he said, for India's permanent membership of the Security Council with veto power. This was not the same case that could be made for any other aspirant. It was high time, and the purpose of the project, he said that ways be found to bridge the clear aspirations of the developing countries for a revised international order and those of the developed world that this take place in a reasoned and peaceful manner.

Most importantly, it will be important to ensure that any revisions of the international security order give pride of place to the principles of human security. In spite of mentions of the idea in connection with economic development, the reform documents of the past two years did not meaningfully address the links between human security and the exercise by states of their rights to use force.

The organisers used the last session to invite offers from interested governments, research centres and NGOs to host the scheduled workshops and plenary conferences which have been laid out in the programme of work. In doing so, the organisers made plain a high degree of openness in shaping the work programme for such event. The main aim for the first two years phase of this project is to put the issues of reform of the international security order through a comprehensive approach (rather than single issue approaches) back on to the agenda.

A revised project concept should aim at bringing about the creation of a powerful review body for monitoring and speeding up the international treaty-making processes and other norm-creating processes in the field of international security law<sup>8</sup>; Independently of the first aim, it should also promote a more coherent approach to the development of international

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<sup>8</sup> The body must be global in scope but not in membership, as the First Committee of States in the General Assembly set up for the purpose in (1) cannot be reasonably expected to achieve that purpose and nor can the Security Council. Such a concept is entirely beyond the reach of the International Law Commission. The Conference on Disarmament could potentially be reformed to fill this role.

Membership of the new body must include officials, military personnel, academic specialists, journalists and other political activists.

To prevent petrification of the mechanism, it must have both a global manifestation (possibly in Geneva) and regional and/or national mirror elements.

The new body would parallel existing NGOs, such as the International crisis Group, which have a global reach. The main difference would be that the new body would be an NGO with a comprehensive top-down approach to peace and security, while ICG is oriented almost exclusively to addressing specific crises in international peace and security.

security law in areas deemed urgent (such as WMD proliferation and environmental security), where there is reasonable consensus but no movement (human security), and where current law is itself a threat to peace (e.g. sovereignty).

And finally, there is a strong need for promoting the emergence of a field of practice called international security law cognate with that of 'international human rights law' or 'international trade law' but comprehensive in scope to include human security issues. The main aim would be to identify linkages between currently disparate areas in areas of classic security, such as WMD and military basing, but also to ensure the more rapid penetration of new conceptions of security (human security and environmental security).

The key assumption must be an intense mobilisation of political will in the Security Council, the General Assembly, officials of UN member states, other entities, NGOs and academic specialists to address burning issues of international security order that were identified in the reform process of 2003-05, but not addressed in any detail in the Millennium Review Summit Outcomes document.

The reform process cannot be left to states alone or to international civil servants.

The single issue approach to solving some of these security problems (such as nuclear proliferation) will still be important. The emergence of the treaty banning land mines and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are good example of how that process of mobilisation of governments, officials, NGOs, media and academic specialists can work. The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in promoting the norms of humanitarian intervention and in laying out the politics of applying it is another.

But the world cannot wait for the slow process of mobilisation on each issue since that process would take many decades. And there is considerable room to believe that in negotiating quite distinct areas of international security law (e.g. WMD and military basing) in a comprehensive framework, states may surprisingly find trade-offs. Developing country interest in limiting US or NATO access to foreign military bases might be traded-off or shaped to meet US and NATO interests in controlling WMD.

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## Center for International Relations

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### OUR ADDRESS:

ul. Emilii Plater 25, 00-688 WARSZAWA  
tel. (0048-22) 646 52 67, 646 52 68, 629 38 98  
fax (0048-22) 646 52 58  
e-mail: [info@csm.org.pl](mailto:info@csm.org.pl)

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