Wojciech Borodzicz-Smoliński, Member of the Board, CIR: Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev – an indicator of the true state of relations between Belarus and Russia

 

Kurmanbek Bakiyev became president as a result of the Tulip Revolution in 2005, which in itself was a follow-up to the wave of protests present in Ukraine and Georgia, protesting against rising corruption, fraud, and lack of reform. Five years later, when protests of the same spirit occurred yet again, Bakiyev was forced to resign and leave the country, in fear of being arrested and placed under accusation.

Unlike his predecessor, Askar Akayev (who emigrated to Russia), the former president of Kirgizstan found shelter in Belarus. When explaining his decision during his annual parliamentary speech and later interviews, Alexander Lukashenka referenced citations from the statute of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, of which Belarus, Kirgizstan and Russia are a party of. The Collective Security Treaty (ODKB in Russ.) obligates its members to consult each other in the event of a situation which could threaten or harm security in the region (art. 2 http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm).

Paradoxically, the situation in which the President of Belarus found himself, allows simultaneously for both him and his co-workers to receive a sense of the true value of the agreements which have been created in the post Soviet  region.

Lukashenka conveyed the above message in a pretty specific way at an interview given on the day of elections for regional governments. His speech also summarized the signing of an agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the extension of stationing the Black Sea fleet in the Sebastopol base, for which Ukraine in return received a 30% discount on gas (this discount will provide Ukraine with an estimated profit of  $4 billion).

First of all, Lukashenka reproached Russia’s president for the fact that his country accepted Akayev in 2005 after he was overthrown. However, in 2010, Bakiyev was not able to find shelter there. This was contrary to Putin’s statement in 2005, when he claimed that he had full trust in Saliyevich’s campaign.

Furthermore, the Belarus leader expressed a deep shock concerning the CSTO and its lack of action in an effort to defend and protect the Kirgizstan president and government from being overthrown.

Alexander Lukashenka had the right to feel offended by Dmitri Medviedev’s harsh speech, which was given on April 21 in Kharkov,  during a press conference. In his speech, Medviedev stated that partnership, friendship and responsibility  in international relations are not expressed by intentions, but rather by actual actions taken.  The president of Russia also marked that, while you can discuss discounts on gas prices and financial help, it is necessary to primarily answer the question: „ In the name of what, and what will we receive in return” (www.kremlin.ru).

While taking part in this peculiar exchange of thoughts during his meeting with journalists, Lukashenka did not fail to reproach that in Belarus, there are not one, but two Russian army bases,  for which Belarus does not collect any payments, although they are crucial elements in  the relations between Belarus and Russia, as well as in the security of Russia itself.

For the president of  Belarus, his officials, his opposition, as well as Belarus’s society, the following conclusions concerning Minsk-Moscow tension are very important:

1. As a result of its failure to show support for Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the Russian Federation demonstrated that it is ready to support any government which acquires power in a realistic way and leads to the settlement of the internal situation. Even if the acquisition of power takes place as a result of bloody riots.
-This means that the authority of Belarus’ president will be tolerated by the Russian Federation up until the point where a true power emerges, (from inside the state, opposition, or even a combination of the two) one that is capable of keeping order in the country.
-Consequently the question of how much will such an authority be directed towards the outside, and how much will it serve as a real alternative for Belarus, currently remains without an answer.

2. The lack of a swift reaction from the CSTO points towards a complete subordination of this organization towards the directions imposed upon it by its strongest member. Thus we can conclude that the remaining agreements between countries of the post Soviet Union function under the condition that they appeal to the Russian Federation. This confirms the theory that no changes can be made in the post soviet region without at least a silent nod from the RF.

3. In order for Minsk to maintain its balance between Russia and the European Union, it will continue economic relations with the West. It can be expected that Russia will attempt to weaken Lukashenka in the eyes of the public preceding the presidential elections, which are planned for February 2011. This weakening might take place for example by forcing the Belarus administration to continue „hosting” Russian military bases on its territory.
- On May 3 2010, the head of the National Election Committee, Lidya Yermoshyna, declared that elections could be held as soon as fall of 2010. This indicates that authorities are expecting a worsening of the internal state of matters.

4. The acceptance of Kirgizstan’s former leader caused great dissatisfaction in Russia. In a short while we will be able to tell just how much exactly Moscow is supporting the new authorities of Kirgizstan. It is possible that the struggle of handing over Kurmanbek Saliyevich to Kirgizstan authorities will be another demonstration of power and true influence on the region, not only to Lukashenka, but most importantly to the European Union, which despite the commencement of the Eastern Partnership, is still incapable of offering its members that which they expect the most - money.